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The class meets TR9-11 (except October 23, when the class meets 1-3) in WW120. The tutorial session, led by Ruizhi Zhu, meets R2-4 in WW120 starting on October 25.

I will post slides for each class at latest the day before the class. The compact versions are best for printing, the complete ones best for viewing on a screen.

Class 1 (October 23)
Nash equilibrium (Sections 2.1–2.3 of "A Course in Game Theory").

Class 2 (October 25)
Nash equilibrium continued (Section 2.4); introduction to mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (Section 3.1). [Section 2.5 will be omitted; I will return to the material in Section 2.6.]
Class 3 (October 30)
Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium continued. [Read Section 3.2. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 will be omitted.] Rationalizability and iterated elimination of strictly dominated actions (Section 4.2). Introduction to Bayesian games (Section 2.6).

Class 4 (November 1)
Bayesian games continued (Section 2.6); purification of mixed strategy equilbria (Sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4)
Class 5 (November 13)
Auctions; juries

Class 6 (November 15)
Extensive games with perfect information: strategies, Nash equilibrium, subgame perfect equilibrium, the one deviation property (Sections 6.1, 6.2).
Class 7 (November 20)
Extensive games with perfect information: backward induction; Stackelberg games; ultimatum game; holdup game; adding chance moves and simultaneous moves (Section 6.3); Chain-Store game (Section 6.5.1).

Class 8 (November 22)
Bargaining theory: bargaining game of alternating offers (Chapter 7, omitting the proof of uniqueness in Proposition 122.1).
Class 9 (November 27)
Nash bargaining solution (Sections 15.1, 15.2 (using the approach on pp. 308–309), 15.3). Relation between Nash solution and subgame perfect equilibrium of bargaining game of alternating offers (Section 15.4). Introduction to repeated games.

Class 10 (November 29)
Repeated games (Sections 8.1–8.5 (preferences with discounting only)).
Class 11 (December 4)
Repeated games: Subgame perfect equilibrium (Section 8.8), finitely repeated games (Section 8.10).

Class 12 (December 6)
Extensive games with imperfect information: Introduction (Sections 11.1, 11.4, 11.5, 12.1–12.3).