# ECO2030: Microeconomic Theory II, module 1 Lecture 10

Martin J. Osborne

Department of Economics University of Toronto

#### 2018.11.29

© 2018 by Martin J. Osborne

Table of contents

Repeated interaction

Repeated games Example: Prisoner's Dilemma Questions

Preferences Discounting

NE of Prisoner's Dilemma

Strategies Examples

Limited punishment

NE payoffs Feasible payoffs Equilibrium payoffs Every NE payoff profile is enforceable Every strictly enforceable payoff profile is close to a NE

Same set of players interact repeatedly

- Same set of players interact repeatedly
- Every player remembers other players' previous actions

- Same set of players interact repeatedly
- Every player remembers other players' previous actions
- ► Each player can condition her action in period t on other players' actions in periods 1, ..., t – 1

- Same set of players interact repeatedly
- Every player remembers other players' previous actions
- ► Each player can condition her action in period t on other players' actions in periods 1, ..., t – 1
- Extensive game with perfect information and simultaneous moves

Let  $G = \langle N, (A_i), (\succeq_i) \rangle$  be strategic game; denote  $A = \times_{i \in N} A_i$ 

Let  $G = \langle N, (A_i), (\succeq_i) \rangle$  be strategic game; denote  $A = \times_{i \in N} A_i$ 

An *infinitely repeated game* of *G* is an extensive game  $\langle N, H, P, (\succeq_i^*) \rangle$  where

Let  $G = \langle N, (A_i), (\succeq_i) \rangle$  be strategic game; denote  $A = \times_{i \in N} A_i$ 

An *infinitely repeated game* of *G* is an extensive game  $\langle N, H, P, (\succeq_i^*) \rangle$  where

$$\blacktriangleright H = \{\varnothing\} \cup (\cup_{t=1}^{\infty} A^t) \cup A^{\infty}$$

Let  $G = \langle N, (A_i), (\succeq_i) \rangle$  be strategic game; denote  $A = \times_{i \in N} A_i$ Set of finite sequences An *infini* of action profiles in *G*  $\langle N, H, P, (\succeq_i) \rangle$  where  $H = \{ \varnothing \} \cup (\cup_{t=1}^{\infty} A^t) \cup A^{\infty}$ 

Let  $G = \langle N, (A_i), (\succeq_i) \rangle$  be strategic game; denote  $A = \times_{i \in N} A_i$ Set of infinite sequences of An *infinitely* reaction profiles in *G* (terminal)  $\langle N, H, P, (\succeq_i^*) \rangle$  where  $H = \{ \varnothing \} \cup (\cup_{i=1}^{\infty} A^i) \cup A^{\infty}$ 

Let  $G = \langle N, (A_i), (\succeq_i) \rangle$  be strategic game; denote  $A = \times_{i \in N} A_i$ 

An *infinitely repeated game* of *G* is an extensive game  $\langle N, H, P, (\succeq_i^*) \rangle$  where

- *H* = {∅} ∪ (∪<sup>∞</sup><sub>t=1</sub>*A<sup>t</sup>*) ∪ *A<sup>∞</sup>* (where *A<sup>∞</sup>* is set of infinite sequences (*a<sup>t</sup>*)<sup>∞</sup><sub>t=1</sub> of action profiles in *G*)
- *P*(*h*) = *N* for all *h*

Let  $G = \langle N, (A_i), (\succeq_i) \rangle$  be strategic game; denote  $A = \times_{i \in N} A_i$ 

An *infinitely repeated game* of *G* is an extensive game  $\langle N, H, P, (\succeq_i^*) \rangle$  where

- *H* = {∅} ∪ (∪<sup>∞</sup><sub>t=1</sub>*A<sup>t</sup>*) ∪ *A*<sup>∞</sup> (where *A*<sup>∞</sup> is set of infinite sequences (*a<sup>t</sup>*)<sup>∞</sup><sub>t=1</sub> of action profiles in *G*)
- ▶ P(h) = N for all h
- ≿<sup>\*</sup><sub>i</sub> is a preference relation on A<sup>∞</sup> that extends ≿<sub>i</sub> in the sense that if (a<sup>t</sup>) ∈ A<sup>∞</sup>, a ∈ A, a' ∈ A, and a ≿<sub>i</sub> a' then

$$(a^{1},...,a^{t-1},a,a^{t+1},...) \succeq_{i}^{*} (a^{1},...,a^{t-1},a',a^{t+1},...)$$

for all values of t

Let  $G = \langle N, (A_i), (\succeq_i) \rangle$  be strategic game; denote  $A = \times_{i \in N} A_i$ 

An *infinitely repeated game* of *G* is an extensive game  $\langle N, H, P, (\succeq_i^*) \rangle$  where

- *H* = {∅} ∪ (∪<sup>∞</sup><sub>t=1</sub>*A<sup>t</sup>*) ∪ *A<sup>∞</sup>* (where *A<sup>∞</sup>* is set of infinite sequences (*a<sup>t</sup>*)<sup>∞</sup><sub>t=1</sub> of action profiles in *G*)
- P(h) = N for all h
- ►  $\gtrsim_i^*$  is a prefet Sequences differ only in sense that if  $\frac{1}{th}$  component (*a* vs. *a*') and *a*  $\gtrsim_i$  *a*' then

$$(a^1,\ldots,a^{t-1},\underline{a},a^{t+1},\ldots) \succeq_i^* (a^1,\ldots,a^{t-1},\underline{a}',a^{t+1},\ldots)$$

for all values of t

Suppose G is Prisoner's Dilemma

	С	D
С	3,3	0,4
D	4,0	1,1

Suppose G is Prisoner's Dilemma

	С	D
С	3,3	0,4
D	4,0	1,1

G has unique Nash equilibrium, (D, D)

Suppose G is Prisoner's Dilemma

	С	D
С	3,3	0,4
D	4,0	1,1

G has unique Nash equilibrium, (D, D)

#### Repeated game

"[T]he strategies: [player 1] plays [*C*] 'til [player 2] plays [*D*], then [*D*] ever after, [player 2] plays [*C*] 'til [player 1] plays [*D*], then [*D*] ever after, are very nearly at equilibrium [in a 100-period repetition of the game] and in a game with an indeterminate stop point or an infinite game with interest on utility it is an equilibrium point."

Suppose G is Prisoner's Dilemma

	С	D
С	3,3	0,4
D	4,0	1,1

G has unique Nash equilibrium, (D, D)

#### Repeated game

"[T]he strategies: [player 1] plays [*C*] 'til [player 2] plays [*D*], then [*D*] ever after, [player 2] plays [*C*] 'til [player 1] plays [*D*], then [*D*] ever after, are very nearly at equilibrium [in a 100-period repetition of the game] and in a game with an indeterminate stop point or an infinite game with interest on utility it is an equilibrium point." (John F. Nash, commenting on an experiment in January 1950)

Suppose G is Prisoner's Dilemma

	С	D
С	3,3	0,4
D	4,0	1,1

G has unique Nash equilibrium, (D, D)

Infinitely repeated game

• Define strategy  $s_i^*$  by  $s_i^*(\emptyset) = C$ 

Suppose G is Prisoner's Dilemma

	С	D
С	3,3	0,4
D	4,0	1,1

G has unique Nash equilibrium, (D, D)

Infinitely repeated game

• Define strategy  $s_i^*$  by  $s_i^*(\emptyset) = C$  and

$$s_i^*(a^1,\ldots,a^{t-1}) = \begin{cases} & ext{ if } a_j^{ au} = C ext{ for } au = 1,\ldots,t-1 \end{cases}$$

Suppose G is Prisoner's Dilemma

	С	D
С	3,3	0,4
D	4,0	1,1

G has unique Nash equilibrium, (D, D)

Infinitely repeated game

• Define strategy  $s_i^*$  by  $s_i^*(\emptyset) = C$  and

$$s_i^*(a^1,\ldots,a^{t-1}) = \begin{cases} C & ext{if } a_j^{ au} = C ext{ for } au = 1,\ldots,t-1 \end{cases}$$

Suppose G is Prisoner's Dilemma

	С	D
С	3,3	0,4
D	4,0	1,1

G has unique Nash equilibrium, (D, D)

Infinitely repeated game

▶ Define strategy s<sup>\*</sup><sub>i</sub> by s<sup>\*</sup><sub>i</sub>(∅) = C and

$$s_i^*(a^1,\ldots,a^{t-1}) = egin{cases} C & ext{if } a_j^ au = C ext{ for } au = 1,\ldots,t-1 \ & ext{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Suppose G is Prisoner's Dilemma

	С	D
С	3,3	0,4
D	4,0	1,1

G has unique Nash equilibrium, (D, D)

Infinitely repeated game

▶ Define strategy s<sup>\*</sup><sub>i</sub> by s<sup>\*</sup><sub>i</sub>(∅) = C and

$$\mathbf{s}^*_i(\mathbf{a}^1,\ldots,\mathbf{a}^{t-1}) = egin{cases} C & ext{if } \mathbf{a}^ au_j = C ext{ for } au = 1,\ldots,t-1 \ D & ext{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$\begin{array}{c|c} C & D \\ \hline C & 3,3 & 0,4 \\ \hline D & 4,0 & 1,1 \end{array} \quad s_i^*(a^1,\ldots,a^{t-1}) = \begin{cases} C & \text{if } a_j^\tau = C \text{ for } \tau = 1,\ldots,t-1 \\ D & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$\begin{array}{c|c} C & D \\ \hline C & 3,3 & 0,4 \\ \hline D & 4,0 & 1,1 \end{array} \quad s_i^*(a^1,\ldots,a^{t-1}) = \begin{cases} C & \text{if } a_j^\tau = C \text{ for } \tau = 1,\ldots,t-1 \\ D & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

If P2 uses strategy  $s_2^*$ , what is P1's best response?

Strategy that chooses C after every history in which P2 chose C in every period (e.g. s<sup>\*</sup><sub>1</sub>)

$$\begin{array}{c|c} C & D \\ \hline C & 3,3 & 0,4 \\ \hline D & 4,0 & 1,1 \end{array} \quad s_i^*(a^1,\ldots,a^{t-1}) = \begin{cases} C & \text{if } a_j^\tau = C \text{ for } \tau = 1,\ldots,t-1 \\ D & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

- Strategy that chooses C after every history in which P2 chose C in every period (e.g. s<sup>\*</sup><sub>1</sub>)
  - ▶ outcome (C, C) in every period

$$\begin{array}{c|c} C & D \\ \hline C & 3,3 & 0,4 \\ \hline D & 4,0 & 1,1 \end{array} \quad s_i^*(a^1,\ldots,a^{t-1}) = \begin{cases} C & \text{if } a_j^\tau = C \text{ for } \tau = 1,\ldots,t-1 \\ D & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

- Strategy that chooses C after every history in which P2 chose C in every period (e.g. s<sup>\*</sup><sub>1</sub>)
  - ▶ outcome (C, C) in every period
  - payoffs (3,3) in every period

$$\begin{array}{c|c} C & D \\ \hline C & 3,3 & 0,4 \\ \hline D & 4,0 & 1,1 \end{array} \quad s_i^*(a^1,\ldots,a^{t-1}) = \begin{cases} C & \text{if } a_j^\tau = C \text{ for } \tau = 1,\ldots,t-1 \\ D & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

- Strategy that chooses C after every history in which P2 chose C in every period (e.g. s<sup>\*</sup><sub>1</sub>)
  - ▶ outcome (C, C) in every period
  - payoffs (3,3) in every period
- Strategy that chooses D in some period t after history in which P2 chose C in every previous period

$$\begin{array}{c|c} C & D \\ \hline C & 3,3 & 0,4 \\ \hline D & 4,0 & 1,1 \end{array} \quad s_i^*(a^1,\ldots,a^{t-1}) = \begin{cases} C & \text{if } a_j^\tau = C \text{ for } \tau = 1,\ldots,t-1 \\ D & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

- Strategy that chooses C after every history in which P2 chose C in every period (e.g. s<sup>\*</sup><sub>1</sub>)
  - ▶ outcome (C, C) in every period
  - payoffs (3,3) in every period
- Strategy that chooses D in some period t after history in which P2 chose C in every previous period
  - outcome in period t is (D, C), with payoffs (4, 0)

$$\begin{array}{c|c} C & D \\ \hline C & 3,3 & 0,4 \\ \hline D & 4,0 & 1,1 \end{array} \quad s_i^*(a^1,\ldots,a^{t-1}) = \begin{cases} C & \text{if } a_j^\tau = C \text{ for } \tau = 1,\ldots,t-1 \\ D & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

- Strategy that chooses C after every history in which P2 chose C in every period (e.g. s<sup>\*</sup><sub>1</sub>)
  - ▶ outcome (C, C) in every period
  - payoffs (3,3) in every period
- Strategy that chooses D in some period t after history in which P2 chose C in every previous period
  - outcome in period t is (D, C), with payoffs (4, 0)
  - in every subsequent period P2 chooses D

$$\begin{array}{c|c} C & D \\ \hline C & 3,3 & 0,4 \\ \hline D & 4,0 & 1,1 \end{array} \quad s_i^*(a^1,\ldots,a^{t-1}) = \begin{cases} C & \text{if } a_j^\tau = C \text{ for } \tau = 1,\ldots,t-1 \\ D & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

- Strategy that chooses C after every history in which P2 chose C in every period (e.g. s<sup>\*</sup><sub>1</sub>)
  - ▶ outcome (C, C) in every period
  - payoffs (3,3) in every period
- Strategy that chooses D in some period t after history in which P2 chose C in every previous period
  - outcome in period t is (D, C), with payoffs (4, 0)
  - in every subsequent period P2 chooses D
  - payoff to P1 in every subsequent period is at most 1

$$\begin{array}{c|c} C & D \\ \hline C & 3,3 & 0,4 \\ \hline D & 4,0 & 1,1 \end{array} \quad s_i^*(a^1,\ldots,a^{t-1}) = \begin{cases} C & \text{if } a_j^\tau = C \text{ for } \tau = 1,\ldots,t-1 \\ D & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

- Strategy that chooses C after every history in which P2 chose C in every period (e.g. s<sup>\*</sup><sub>1</sub>)
  - ▶ outcome (C, C) in every period
  - payoffs (3,3) in every period
- Strategy that chooses D in some period t after history in which P2 chose C in every previous period
  - outcome in period t is (D, C), with payoffs (4, 0)
  - in every subsequent period P2 chooses D
  - payoff to P1 in every subsequent period is at most 1
  - best option for P1 is to choose D after period t

$$\begin{array}{c|c} C & D \\ \hline C & 3,3 & 0,4 \\ \hline D & 4,0 & 1,1 \end{array} \quad s_i^*(a^1,\ldots,a^{t-1}) = \begin{cases} C & \text{if } a_j^\tau = C \text{ for } \tau = 1,\ldots,t-1 \\ D & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

So P1's choice is between

$$\begin{array}{c|c} C & D \\ \hline C & 3,3 & 0,4 \\ \hline D & 4,0 & 1,1 \end{array} \quad s^*_i(a^1,\ldots,a^{t-1}) = \begin{cases} C & \text{if } a^\tau_j = C \text{ for } \tau = 1,\ldots,t-1 \\ D & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

So P1's choice is between

stick to 
$$C \Rightarrow$$
 payoffs  $(3, 3, \ldots, 3, 3, 3, 3, \ldots)$ 

$$\begin{array}{c|c} C & D \\ \hline C & 3,3 & 0,4 \\ \hline D & 4,0 & 1,1 \end{array} \quad s_i^*(a^1,\ldots,a^{t-1}) = \begin{cases} C & \text{if } a_j^\tau = C \text{ for } \tau = 1,\ldots,t-1 \\ D & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

So P1's choice is between

stick to  $C \Rightarrow$  payoffs (3, 3, ..., 3, 3, 3, 3, ...)deviate to D in period  $t \Rightarrow$  payoffs (3, 3, ..., 3, 4, 1, 1, ...)

$$\begin{array}{c|c} C & D \\ \hline C & 3,3 & 0,4 \\ \hline D & 4,0 & 1,1 \end{array} \quad s_i^*(a^1,\ldots,a^{t-1}) = \begin{cases} C & \text{if } a_j^\tau = C \text{ for } \tau = 1,\ldots,t-1 \\ D & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

So P1's choice is between

stick to  $C \Rightarrow$  payoffs  $(3, 3, \dots, 3, 3, 3, 3, \dots)$ deviate to *D* in period  $t \Rightarrow$  payoffs  $(3, 3, \dots, 3, 4, 1, 1, \dots)$ 

If P1 is not too impatient, (3,3,...) is better, so best response is strategy that chooses C after every history in which P2 chooses C in every period

### Repeated games: Example

$$\begin{array}{c|c} C & D \\ \hline C & 3,3 & 0,4 \\ \hline D & 4,0 & 1,1 \end{array} \quad s^*_i(a^1,\ldots,a^{t-1}) = \begin{cases} C & \text{if } a^\tau_j = C \text{ for } \tau = 1,\ldots,t-1 \\ D & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

So P1's choice is between

stick to  $C \Rightarrow$  payoffs  $(3, 3, \dots, 3, 3, 3, 3, \dots)$ deviate to *D* in period  $t \Rightarrow$  payoffs  $(3, 3, \dots, 3, 4, 1, 1, \dots)$ 

- If P1 is not too impatient, (3,3,...) is better, so best response is strategy that chooses C after every history in which P2 chooses C in every period
- s<sub>1</sub><sup>\*</sup> is such a strategy

### Repeated games: Example

$$\begin{array}{c|c} C & D \\ \hline C & 3,3 & 0,4 \\ \hline D & 4,0 & 1,1 \end{array} \quad s^*_i(a^1,\ldots,a^{t-1}) = \begin{cases} C & \text{if } a^\tau_j = C \text{ for } \tau = 1,\ldots,t-1 \\ D & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

So P1's choice is between

stick to  $C \Rightarrow$  payoffs (3, 3, ..., 3, 3, 3, 3, ...)deviate to D in period  $t \Rightarrow$  payoffs (3, 3, ..., 3, 4, 1, 1, ...)

- If P1 is not too impatient, (3,3,...) is better, so best response is strategy that chooses C after every history in which P2 chooses C in every period
- s<sup>\*</sup><sub>1</sub> is such a strategy
- Argument is symmetric for P2, so if players are sufficiently patient, (s<sub>1</sub><sup>\*</sup>, s<sub>2</sub><sup>\*</sup>) is a Nash equilibrium

# Repeated games: Example

	С	D
С	3,3	0,4
D	4,0	1,1

#### Conclusion

If players sufficiently patient, strategy pair  $(s_1^*, s_2^*)$  is Nash equilibrium of infinitely repeated game, where  $s_i^*(\emptyset) = C$  and

$$s_i^*(a^1,\ldots,a^{t-1}) = \begin{cases} C & \text{if } a_j^{\tau} = C \text{ for } \tau = 1,\ldots,t-1 \\ D & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

where *j* is the other player

Outcome of this equilibrium is (C, C) in every period

What do we mean by "patience"?

- What do we mean by "patience"?
- How patient do the players have to be for the strategy pair (s<sub>1</sub><sup>\*</sup>, s<sub>2</sub><sup>\*</sup>) to be a Nash equilibrium?

- What do we mean by "patience"?
- ► How patient do the players have to be for the strategy pair (s<sub>1</sub><sup>\*</sup>, s<sub>2</sub><sup>\*</sup>) to be a Nash equilibrium?
- Can the outcome path in which (C, C) is played in every period be supported with less severe punishments?

- What do we mean by "patience"?
- ► How patient do the players have to be for the strategy pair (s<sub>1</sub><sup>\*</sup>, s<sub>2</sub><sup>\*</sup>) to be a Nash equilibrium?
- Can the outcome path in which (C, C) is played in every period be supported with less severe punishments?
- What outcomes other than (C, C) in every period are supported?

- What do we mean by "patience"?
- ► How patient do the players have to be for the strategy pair (s<sub>1</sub><sup>\*</sup>, s<sub>2</sub><sup>\*</sup>) to be a Nash equilibrium?
- Can the outcome path in which (C, C) is played in every period be supported with less severe punishments?
- What outcomes other than (C, C) in every period are supported?
- What about subgame perfect equilibria rather than Nash equilibria? Is it optimal for each player to punish the other player for deviating?

- What do we mean by "patience"?
- ► How patient do the players have to be for the strategy pair (s<sub>1</sub><sup>\*</sup>, s<sub>2</sub><sup>\*</sup>) to be a Nash equilibrium?
- Can the outcome path in which (C, C) is played in every period be supported with less severe punishments?
- What outcomes other than (C, C) in every period are supported?
- What about subgame perfect equilibria rather than Nash equilibria? Is it optimal for each player to punish the other player for deviating?
- What happens in games other than Prisoner's Dilemma?

Discounting Represented by discounted sum of one-shot payoffs: sequence  $(a^1, a^2, ...)$  of outcomes has payoff

$$\sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \delta^{t-1} u_i(a^t)$$

Discounting Represented by discounted sum of one-shot payoffs: sequence  $(a^1, a^2, ...)$  of outcomes has payoff

$$\sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \delta^{t-1} u_i(a^t)$$

Limit of means Preferences essentially represented by

$$\lim_{T\to\infty}\frac{\sum_{t=1}^{T}u_i(a^t)}{T}$$

though need to deal with possibility that limit doesn't exist

Discounting Represented by discounted sum of one-shot payoffs: sequence  $(a^1, a^2, ...)$  of outcomes has payoff

$$\sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \delta^{t-1} u_i(a^t)$$

Limit of means Preferences essentially represented by

$$\lim_{T\to\infty}\frac{\sum_{t=1}^{T}u_{i}(a^{t})}{T}$$

though need to deal with possibility that limit doesn't exist

Overtaking Won't discuss


Will concentrate on preferences with discounting

- Will concentrate on preferences with discounting
- Two strategic games generate same preferences with discounting in repeated game each player's payoffs in one game are affine transformation of her payoffs in other game

- Will concentrate on preferences with discounting
- Two strategic games generate same preferences with discounting in repeated game each player's payoffs in one game are affine transformation of her payoffs in other game

#### Example


G: payoffs  $(u_1, u_2)$ 



G': payoffs 
$$(v_1, v_2)$$


- Will concentrate on preferences with discounting
- Two strategic games generate same preferences with discounting in repeated game each player's payoffs in one game are affine transformation of her payoffs in other game

#### Example




- Will concentrate on preferences with discounting
- Two strategic games generate same preferences with discounting in repeated game each player's payoffs in one game are affine transformation of her payoffs in other game

#### Example




- Will concentrate on preferences with discounting
- Two strategic games generate same preferences with discounting in repeated game each player's payoffs in one game are affine transformation of her payoffs in other game

#### Example



- Will concentrate on preferences with discounting
- Two strategic games generate same preferences with discounting in repeated game each player's payoffs in one game are affine transformation of her payoffs in other game

#### Example




- Will concentrate on preferences with discounting
- Two strategic games generate same preferences with discounting in repeated game each player's payoffs in one game are affine transformation of her payoffs in other game

#### Example

$$\begin{array}{c|c}
C & D \\
\hline
C & 3,3 & 0,4 \\
\hline
D & 4,0 & 1,1 \\
\end{array}$$

G: payoffs  $(u_1, u_2)$ 



G': payoffs 
$$(v_1, v_2)$$

- Payoffs of P1:  $v_1(a) = 1 + 2u_1(a)$  for all a
- Payoffs of P2:  $v_2(a) = -1 + 3u_2(a)$  for all a

- Will concentrate on preferences with discounting
- Two strategic games generate same preferences with discounting in repeated game each player's payoffs in one game are affine transformation of her payoffs in other game

### Example

	С	D		С	D
С	3,3	0,4	С	7,8	1,11
D	4,0	1,1	D	9, <b>-1</b>	3,2

G: payoffs  $(u_1, u_2)$ 

G': payoffs  $(v_1, v_2)$ 

- Payoffs of P1:  $v_1(a) = 1 + 2u_1(a)$  for all a
- Payoffs of P2:  $v_2(a) = -1 + 3u_2(a)$  for all a
- So preferences of player i in infinitely repeated game of G are same as preferences of player i in G', for i = 1, 2

- Will concentrate on preferences with discounting
- Two strategic games generate same preferences with discounting in repeated game each player's payoffs in one game are affine transformation of her payoffs in other game

### Example

	С	D			С	D	
С	3,3 4,0	0,4		С	3,3	0,7	
D	4,0	1,1		D	7,0	1,1	]
G: payoffs $(u_1, u_2)$		<i>G</i> ′:	payof	fs ( <i>u</i> <sub>1</sub> ,	u <sub>2</sub> )		

Payoffs of P1 are ordinally same in two games but not affine transforms of each other

- Will concentrate on preferences with discounting
- Two strategic games generate same preferences with discounting in repeated game each player's payoffs in one game are affine transformation of her payoffs in other game

### Example

	С	D			С	D	
С	3,3	0,4		С	3,3	0,7	
D	4,0	1,1	]	D	7,0	1,1	
G:	payoff	fs ( <i>u</i> ₁,	$u_2$ )	<i>G</i> ′:	payof	fs ( <i>u</i> <sub>1</sub> ,	$u_2$ )

- Payoffs of P1 are ordinally same in two games but not affine transforms of each other
- Different preferences in repeated game: for δ close to one ((C, C), (C, C)) ≻₁ ((C, D), (D, C)) for left game ((C, C), (C, C)) ≺₁ ((C, D), (D, C)) for right game

Instead of working with discounted sum, sometimes convenient to work with discounted average

$$(1-\delta)\sum_{t=1}^{\infty}\delta^{t-1}u_i(a^t)$$

Instead of working with discounted sum, sometimes convenient to work with discounted average

$$(1-\delta)\sum_{t=1}^{\infty}\delta^{t-1}u_i(a^t)$$

For constant stream of payoffs (c, c, ...), discounted average is

$$(1-\delta)(\mathbf{c}+\delta\mathbf{c}+\delta^2\mathbf{c}+\dots)=(1-\delta)$$

Instead of working with discounted sum, sometimes convenient to work with discounted average

$$(1-\delta)\sum_{t=1}^{\infty}\delta^{t-1}u_i(a^t)$$

For constant stream of payoffs (c, c, ...), discounted average is

$$(1-\delta)(\mathbf{c}+\delta\mathbf{c}+\delta^2\mathbf{c}+\dots)=(1-\delta)\frac{\mathbf{c}}{1-\delta}$$

Instead of working with discounted sum, sometimes convenient to work with discounted average

$$(1-\delta)\sum_{t=1}^{\infty}\delta^{t-1}u_i(a^t)$$

For constant stream of payoffs (c, c, ...), discounted average is

$$(1-\delta)(\mathbf{c}+\delta\mathbf{c}+\delta^2\mathbf{c}+\dots)=(1-\delta)\frac{\mathbf{c}}{1-\delta}=\mathbf{c}$$

Instead of working with discounted sum, sometimes convenient to work with discounted average

$$(1-\delta)\sum_{t=1}^{\infty}\delta^{t-1}u_i(a^t)$$

For constant stream of payoffs (c, c, ...), discounted average is

$$(1-\delta)(\mathbf{c}+\delta\mathbf{c}+\delta^2\mathbf{c}+\dots)=(1-\delta)\frac{\mathbf{c}}{1-\delta}=\mathbf{c}$$

 Sometimes refer to player's discounted average payoff simply as her payoff in repeated game

Can now answer question: For the Prisoner's Dilemma

	С	D
С	3,3	0,4
D	4,0	1,1


how patient do the players have to be for the strategy pair  $(s_1^*, s_2^*)$  to be a Nash equilibrium, where

$$egin{aligned} & s_i^*(arnothing) = C \ & s_i^*(a^1,\ldots,a^{t-1}) = egin{cases} C & ext{if } a_j^ au = C ext{ for } au = 1,\ldots,t-1 \ D & ext{otherwise} \end{aligned}$$


for i = 1, 2 and j is the other player?

$$\begin{array}{c|c}
C & D \\
C & 3,3 & 0,4 \\
D & 4,0 & 1,1
\end{array}$$

Suppose P2 uses s<sub>2</sub>\*




Suppose P2 uses  $s_2^*$ P1 uses  $s_1^*$ 




Suppose P2 uses s<sub>2</sub>\*

- ► P1 uses s<sup>\*</sup><sub>1</sub>
  - $\Rightarrow$  P1's payoff is  $3 + 3\delta + 3\delta^2 + \cdots$



Suppose P2 uses s<sub>2</sub>\*

- P1 uses s<sup>\*</sup><sub>1</sub>
  - $\Rightarrow$  P1's payoff is  $3 + 3\delta + 3\delta^2 + \cdots$
- P1 deviates




Suppose P2 uses s<sub>2</sub>\*

P1 uses s<sup>\*</sup><sub>1</sub>


 $\Rightarrow$  P1's payoff is  $3 + 3\delta + 3\delta^2 + \cdots$ 

- P1 deviates
  - $\Rightarrow$  Either outcome remains same *or* changes to (*D*, *C*) in some period *t*




Suppose P2 uses s<sub>2</sub>\*

- P1 uses s<sup>\*</sup><sub>1</sub>
  - $\Rightarrow$  P1's payoff is  $3 + 3\delta + 3\delta^2 + \cdots$
- P1 deviates
  - $\Rightarrow$  Either outcome remains same *or* changes to (*D*, *C*) in some period *t*
  - ⇒ If outcome changes, P2 chooses *D* in every period  $\ge t + 1$



Suppose P2 uses s<sub>2</sub>\*

- P1 uses s<sup>\*</sup><sub>1</sub>
  - $\Rightarrow$  P1's payoff is  $3 + 3\delta + 3\delta^2 + \cdots$
- P1 deviates
  - $\Rightarrow$  Either outcome remains same *or* changes to (*D*, *C*) in some period *t*
  - ⇒ If outcome changes, P2 chooses *D* in every period  $\ge t + 1$
  - ⇒ Best strategy of P1 that deviates in *t* chooses *D* in every period  $\ge t + 1$



Suppose P2 uses s<sub>2</sub>\*

- P1 uses s<sup>\*</sup><sub>1</sub>
  - $\Rightarrow$  P1's payoff is  $3 + 3\delta + 3\delta^2 + \cdots$
- P1 deviates
  - $\Rightarrow$  Either outcome remains same *or* changes to (*D*, *C*) in some period *t*
  - ⇒ If outcome changes, P2 chooses *D* in every period  $\ge t + 1$
  - ⇒ Best strategy of P1 that deviates in *t* chooses *D* in every period  $\ge t + 1$
  - $\Rightarrow$  P1's payoff is  $3 + 3\delta + \cdots + 3\delta^{t-2} + 4\delta^{t-1} + \delta^t + \delta^{t+1} + \cdots$

P1 has no profitable deviation if and only if

 $3+3\delta+\cdots+3\delta^{t-2}+4\delta^{t-1}+\delta^t+\delta^{t+1}+\cdots\leq 3+3\delta+3\delta^2+\cdots$ 

P1 has no profitable deviation if and only if

$$3+3\delta+\cdots+3\delta^{t-2}+4\delta^{t-1}+\delta^t+\delta^{t+1}+\cdots \leq 3+3\delta+3\delta^2+\cdots$$

or

$$4\delta^{t-1} + \delta^t + \delta^{t+1} + \dots \leq 3\delta^{t-1} + 3\delta^t + 3\delta^{t+1} + \dots$$

P1 has no profitable deviation if and only if

$$3+3\delta+\cdots+3\delta^{t-2}+4\delta^{t-1}+\delta^t+\delta^{t+1}+\cdots \leq 3+3\delta+3\delta^2+\cdots$$

or

$$4\delta^{t-1} + \delta^t + \delta^{t+1} + \dots \leq 3\delta^{t-1} + 3\delta^t + 3\delta^{t+1} + \dots$$

or

$$4+\delta+\delta^2+\cdots\leq 3+3\delta+3\delta^2+\cdots$$

P1 has no profitable deviation if and only if

$$3+3\delta+\cdots+3\delta^{t-2}+4\delta^{t-1}+\delta^t+\delta^{t+1}+\cdots \leq 3+3\delta+3\delta^2+\cdots$$

or

$$4\delta^{t-1} + \delta^t + \delta^{t+1} + \dots \leq 3\delta^{t-1} + 3\delta^t + 3\delta^{t+1} + \dots$$

or

$$\mathbf{4} + \delta + \delta^2 + \cdots \leq \mathbf{3} + \mathbf{3}\delta + \mathbf{3}\delta^2 + \cdots$$

or

$$4 + \frac{\delta}{1 - \delta} \leq \frac{3}{1 - \delta} \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad 4(1 - \delta) + \delta \leq 3 \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad \delta \geq \frac{1}{3}$$

P1 has no profitable deviation if and only if

$$3+3\delta+\cdots+3\delta^{t-2}+4\delta^{t-1}+\delta^t+\delta^{t+1}+\cdots \leq 3+3\delta+3\delta^2+\cdots$$

$$4\delta^{t-1} + \delta^t + \delta^{t+1} + \dots \leq 3\delta^{t-1} + 3\delta^t + 3\delta^{t+1} + \dots$$

$$\mathbf{4} + \delta + \delta^2 + \cdots \leq \mathbf{3} + \mathbf{3}\delta + \mathbf{3}\delta^2 + \cdots$$

or

$$\mathbf{4} + \frac{\delta}{1-\delta} \leq \frac{\mathbf{3}}{1-\delta} \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad \mathbf{4}(1-\delta) + \delta \leq \mathbf{3} \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad \delta \geq \frac{1}{3}$$

•  $s_1^*$  is a best response of P1 to  $s_2^* \Leftrightarrow \delta \geq \frac{1}{3}$ 

P1 has no profitable deviation if and only if

$$3+3\delta+\cdots+3\delta^{t-2}+4\delta^{t-1}+\delta^t+\delta^{t+1}+\cdots \leq 3+3\delta+3\delta^2+\cdots$$

$$4\delta^{t-1} + \delta^t + \delta^{t+1} + \dots \leq 3\delta^{t-1} + 3\delta^t + 3\delta^{t+1} + \dots$$

$$\mathbf{4} + \delta + \delta^2 + \dots \leq \mathbf{3} + \mathbf{3}\delta + \mathbf{3}\delta^2 + \dots$$

or

$$4 + \frac{\delta}{1 - \delta} \leq \frac{3}{1 - \delta} \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad 4(1 - \delta) + \delta \leq 3 \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad \delta \geq \frac{1}{3}$$

•  $s_1^*$  is a best response of P1 to  $s_2^* \Leftrightarrow \delta \ge \frac{1}{3}$ Conclusion:  $(s_1^*, s_2^*)$  is a Nash equilibrium if and only if  $\delta \ge \frac{1}{3}$ 

Can represent strategies compactly in figure:

$$s_1^*$$
:  $(C, C), (D, C)$  all outcomes  
 $\mathcal{C}: C$   $(C, D), (D, D)$ 

Can represent strategies compactly in figure:

$$s_1^*$$
:  $(C, C), (D, C)$  all outcomes  
 $\mathcal{C}: C$   $(C, D), (D, D)$ 

Viewed this way, the strategy is an automaton, consisting of

Can represent strategies compactly in figure:

$$s_1^*$$
:  $(C, C), (D, C)$  all outcomes  
 $(C, D), (D, D)$ 

Viewed this way, the strategy is an automaton, consisting of a set  $Q_i$  (states)  $\{C, D\}$ 

Can represent strategies compactly in figure:

$$s_1^*$$
:  $(C, C), (D, C)$  all outcomes  
 $\mathcal{C}: C$   $(C, D), (D, D)$ 

Viewed this way, the strategy is an automaton, consisting of a set  $Q_i$  (states)  $\{C, D\}$  $q_i^0 \in Q_i$  (initial state) C

Can represent strategies compactly in figure:

$$s_1^*$$
:  $(C, C), (D, C)$  all outcomes  
 $\mathcal{C}: C$   $(C, D), (D, D)$ 

Viewed this way, the strategy is an automaton, consisting of

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{a set } Q_i \text{ (states)} & \{\mathcal{C}, \mathcal{D}\} \\ q_i^0 \in \mathsf{Q}_i \text{ (initial state)} & \mathcal{C} \\ f_i \colon \mathsf{Q}_i \to \mathsf{A}_i \text{ (output function)} & f_i(\mathcal{C}) = \mathsf{C}, \ f_i(\mathcal{D}) = \mathsf{D} \end{array}$$

Can represent strategies compactly in figure:

$$s_1^*$$
:  $(C, C), (D, C)$  all outcomes  
 $\mathcal{C}: C$   $(C, D), (D, D)$ 

Viewed this way, the strategy is an automaton, consisting of

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{a set } Q_i \text{ (states)} & \{\mathcal{C}, \mathcal{D}\} \\ q_i^0 \in Q_i \text{ (initial state)} & \mathcal{C} \\ f_i \colon Q_i \to A_i \text{ (output function)} & f_i(\mathcal{C}) = \mathcal{C}, f_i(\mathcal{D}) = \mathcal{D} \\ \tau_i \colon Q_i \times A \to Q_i & \tau_i(\mathcal{C}, (\mathcal{C}, \mathcal{C})) = \tau_i(\mathcal{C}, (\mathcal{D}, \mathcal{C})) = \mathcal{C}, \\ \text{(transition function)} & \tau_i(\mathcal{C}, (\mathcal{C}, \mathcal{D})) = \tau_i(\mathcal{C}, (\mathcal{D}, \mathcal{D})) = \\ \tau_i(\mathcal{D}, (a_1, a_2)) = \mathcal{D} \text{ for all } (a_1, a_2) \end{array}$$

Can represent strategies compactly in figure:

$$s_1^*$$
:  $(C, C), (D, C)$  all outcomes  
 $\mathcal{C}: C$   $(C, D), (D, D)$ 

Viewed this way, the strategy is an automaton, consisting of

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{a set } Q_i \text{ (states)} & \{\mathcal{C}, \mathcal{D}\} \\ q_i^0 \in Q_i \text{ (initial state)} & \mathcal{C} \\ f_i \colon Q_i \to A_i \text{ (output function)} & f_i(\mathcal{C}) = \mathcal{C}, f_i(\mathcal{D}) = \mathcal{D} \\ \tau_i \colon Q_i \times A \to Q_i & \tau_i(\mathcal{C}, (\mathcal{C}, \mathcal{C})) = \tau_i(\mathcal{C}, (\mathcal{D}, \mathcal{C})) = \mathcal{C}, \\ \text{(transition function)} & \tau_i(\mathcal{C}, (\mathcal{C}, \mathcal{D})) = \tau_i(\mathcal{C}, (\mathcal{D}, \mathcal{D})) = \\ \tau_i(\mathcal{D}, (a_1, a_2)) = \mathcal{D} \text{ for all } (a_1, a_2) \end{array}$$

Additional benefit of representing strategy in this way: measure of complexity of strategy is number of states

Any automaton  $\langle Q_i, q_i^0, f_i, \tau_i \rangle$  defines a strategy as follows: •  $s_i(\emptyset) = f_i(q_i^0)$ 

Any automaton  $\langle Q_i, q_i^0, f_i, \tau_i \rangle$  defines a strategy as follows:

*s<sub>i</sub>*(∅) = *f<sub>i</sub>*(*q<sub>i</sub>*<sup>0</sup>)
*s<sub>i</sub>*(*a*<sup>1</sup>) = *f<sub>i</sub>*(
$$\tau_i(q_i^0, a^1)$$
) for all *a*<sup>1</sup> ∈ *A*


Any automaton  $\langle Q_i, q_i^0, f_i, \tau_i \rangle$  defines a strategy as follows:

*s<sub>i</sub>*(∅) = *f<sub>i</sub>*(*q<sub>i</sub><sup>0</sup>*) *s<sub>i</sub>*(*a*<sup>1</sup>) = *f<sub>i</sub>*(*τ<sub>i</sub>*(*q<sub>i</sub><sup>0</sup>*, *a*<sup>1</sup>)) for all *a*<sup>1</sup> ∈ *A s<sub>i</sub>*(*a*<sup>1</sup>, *a*<sup>2</sup>) = *f<sub>i</sub>*(*τ<sub>i</sub>*(*τ<sub>i</sub>*(*q<sub>i</sub><sup>0</sup>*, *a*<sup>1</sup>), *a*<sup>2</sup>)) for all (*a*<sup>1</sup>, *a*<sup>2</sup>) ∈ *A* × *A*


Any automaton  $\langle Q_i, q_i^0, f_i, \tau_i \rangle$  defines a strategy as follows:

- $s_i(\emptyset) = f_i(q_i^0)$
- ►  $s_i(a^1) = f_i(\tau_i(q_i^0, a^1))$  for all  $a^1 \in A$
- $s_i(a^1, a^2) = f_i(\tau_i(q_i^0, a^1), a^2))$  for all  $(a^1, a^2) \in A \times A$
- and so on

#### Three-period punishment




Three-period punishment




Tit-for-tat


Three-period punishment




Tit-for-tat



Three-period punishment




Tit-for-tat




All-D

Three-period punishment




Tit-for-tat




All-D



	U	D
С	3,3	0,4
D	4,0	1,1




	C	D
С	3,3	0,4
D	4,0	1,1




Does infinitely repeated game have Nash equilibrium in which each player uses limited punishment strategy?

	C	D
С	3,3	0,4
D	4,0	1,1




- Does infinitely repeated game have Nash equilibrium in which each player uses limited punishment strategy?
- Suppose P2 uses limited punishment strategy with k periods of punishment

	C	D
С	3,3	0,4
D	4,0	1,1




- Does infinitely repeated game have Nash equilibrium in which each player uses limited punishment strategy?
- Suppose P2 uses limited punishment strategy with k periods of punishment
- When is it optimal for P1 to use same strategy?

	U	D
С	3,3	0,4
D	4,0	1,1




If P1 uses same strategy, outcome is

	U	D
С	3,3	0,4
D	4,0	1,1




If P1 uses same strategy, outcome is (C, C) in every period ⇒ P1's payoff is 3 in every period

	C	D
С	3,3	0,4
D	4,0	1,1



If P1 has profitable deviation, then deviation to D in period 1 that returns to C in period k + 2 is profitable

	C	D
С	3,3	0,4
D	4,0	1,1




If P1 has profitable deviation, then deviation to D in period 1 that returns to C in period k + 2 is profitable Resulting outcomes and payoffs to P1:

$$\begin{array}{ccc} (D,C) & 4 \\ (D,D) & 1 \\ (D,D) & 1 \\ & \vdots & \vdots \end{array}$$


- 1 first period of punishment
- (D, D) 1 last period of punishment

	U	D
С	3,3	0,4
D	4,0	1,1




$$\mathbf{4} + \delta + \delta^2 + \dots + \delta^k \leq \mathbf{3} + \mathbf{3}\delta + \mathbf{3}\delta^2 + \dots + \mathbf{3}\delta^k$$

	U	D
С	3,3	0,4
D	4,0	1,1




$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{4} + \delta + \delta^2 + \cdots + \delta^k &\leq \mathbf{3} + \mathbf{3}\delta + \mathbf{3}\delta^2 + \cdots + \mathbf{3}\delta^k \\ \mathbf{3} + (\mathbf{1} + \delta + \delta^2 + \cdots + \delta^k) &\leq \mathbf{3}(\mathbf{1} + \delta + \delta^2 + \cdots + \delta^k) \end{aligned}$$

	U	D
С	3,3	0,4
D	4,0	1,1




$$egin{aligned} 4+\delta+\delta^2+\dots+\delta^k&\leq \mathbf{3}+\mathbf{3}\delta+\mathbf{3}\delta^2+\dots+\mathbf{3}\delta^k\ \mathbf{3}+(\mathbf{1}+\delta+\delta^2+\dots+\delta^k)&\leq \mathbf{3}(\mathbf{1}+\delta+\delta^2+\dots+\delta^k)\ \mathbf{3}&\leq rac{\mathbf{2}(\mathbf{1}-\delta^{k+1})}{\mathbf{1}-\delta} \end{aligned}$$

	U	D
С	3,3	0,4
D	4,0	1,1



$$egin{aligned} 4+\delta+\delta^2+\dots+\delta^k&\leq \mathbf{3}+\mathbf{3}\delta+\mathbf{3}\delta^2+\dots+\mathbf{3}\delta^k\ \mathbf{3}+(\mathbf{1}+\delta+\delta^2+\dots+\delta^k)&\leq \mathbf{3}(\mathbf{1}+\delta+\delta^2+\dots+\delta^k)\ \mathbf{3}&\leq rac{\mathbf{2}(\mathbf{1}-\delta^{k+1})}{\mathbf{1}-\delta}\ \mathbf{1}-\mathbf{3}\delta+\mathbf{2}\delta^{k+1}&\leq \mathbf{0} \end{aligned}$$

	U	D
С	3,3	0,4
D	4,0	1,1



$$\begin{aligned} 4+\delta+\delta^2+\dots+\delta^k &\leq 3+3\delta+3\delta^2+\dots+3\delta^k\\ 3+(1+\delta+\delta^2+\dots+\delta^k) &\leq 3(1+\delta+\delta^2+\dots+\delta^k)\\ 3&\leq \frac{2(1-\delta^{k+1})}{1-\delta}\\ 1-3\delta+2\delta^{k+1} &\leq 0\\ k=1 \Rightarrow \delta \geq \frac{1}{2}; \ k\uparrow \Rightarrow \text{cutoff value of } \delta\downarrow\frac{1}{3} \end{aligned}$$

## Nash equilibrium with limited punishment?

#### Conclusion

For any value of k ≥ 1, strategy pair in which each player punishes other for k periods in event of deviation is Nash equilibrium of infinitely repeated game if δ is close enough to 1

## Nash equilibrium with limited punishment?

#### Conclusion


- For any value of k ≥ 1, strategy pair in which each player punishes other for k periods in event of deviation is Nash equilibrium of infinitely repeated game if δ is close enough to 1
- Larger k ⇒ smaller lower bound on δ: mutually desirable outcome (C, C) is sustained by short punishment only if players are relatively patient

#### Feasible payoffs

First consider payoffs that are *possible* when players are patient (discounting with  $\delta$  close to 1, or limit of means)


#### Feasible payoffs

First consider payoffs that are *possible* when players are patient (discounting with  $\delta$  close to 1, or limit of means)



# What payoffs can be achieved in a Nash equilibrium? Feasible payoffs


First consider payoffs that are *possible* when players are patient (discounting with  $\delta$  close to 1, or limit of means)



► Action pair (C, C) in every period ⇒ (discounted average, and limit of means) payoffs (3,3)

#### Feasible payoffs


First consider payoffs that are *possible* when players are patient (discounting with  $\delta$  close to 1, or limit of means)



Similarly for repetitions of other action pairs

#### Feasible payoffs


First consider payoffs that are *possible* when players are patient (discounting with  $\delta$  close to 1, or limit of means)



• Could alternate between (C, C) and  $(D, C) \Rightarrow$  payoffs close to  $(\frac{7}{2}, \frac{3}{2})$ 

#### Feasible payoffs


First consider payoffs that are *possible* when players are patient (discounting with  $\delta$  close to 1, or limit of means)



Similarly could cycle through any other sequence of outcomes
 average of payoffs to outcomes in sequence

#### Feasible payoffs

First consider payoffs that are *possible* when players are patient (discounting with  $\delta$  close to 1, or limit of means)



 Can approximately achieve any linear combination of payoffs in stage game

#### One Nash equilibrium


Pair  $(s^*, s^*)$  of punishment strategies is a Nash equilibrium of repeated game, yielding discounted average payoffs (3,3)

#### One Nash equilibrium

Pair  $(s^*, s^*)$  of punishment strategies is a Nash equilibrium of repeated game, yielding discounted average payoffs (3, 3)

#### Another Nash equilibrium

Consider strategy  $\hat{s}$  in which each player chooses *D* after every history:




#### One Nash equilibrium


Pair  $(s^*, s^*)$  of punishment strategies is a Nash equilibrium of repeated game, yielding discounted average payoffs (3, 3)


#### Another Nash equilibrium


Consider strategy  $\hat{s}$  in which each player chooses *D* after every history:




 $(\hat{s},\hat{s})$  is a Nash equilibrium of the repeated game, yielding payoffs (1,1)







- Are payoffs (0,4) possible in Nash equilibrium?
- No, because by choosing D after every history, P1 guarantees payoff of at least 1 in every period



- Are payoffs (0,4) possible in Nash equilibrium?
- No, because by choosing D after every history, P1 guarantees payoff of at least 1 in every period
- In any Nash equilibrium, payoff of each player is at least 1

For general strategic game, the payoff player *i* can guarantee in any period is her minmax payoff

 $\max_{a_i \in A_i} u_i(a_{-i}, a_i)$ 

Highest payoff possible for *i* given  $a_{-i}$ 

For general strategic game, the payoff player *i* can guarantee in any period is her minmax payoff

$$v_i = \min_{a_{-i} \in A_{-i}} \left( \max_{a_i \in A_i} u_i(a_{-i}, a_i) \right)$$

For general strategic game, the payoff player *i* can guarantee in any period is her minmax payoff

$$V_i = \min_{\boldsymbol{a}_{-i} \in \mathcal{A}_{-i}} \left( \max_{\boldsymbol{a}_i \in \mathcal{A}_i} u_i(\boldsymbol{a}_{-i}, \boldsymbol{a}_i) \right)$$

Example

	Α	В	С
Α	1,1	0,0	2,3
В	0,0	1,2	1,2
С	0,2	2,3	3,1

For general strategic game, the payoff player *i* can guarantee in any period is her minmax payoff

$$v_i = \min_{\boldsymbol{a}_{-i} \in \mathcal{A}_{-i}} \left( \max_{\boldsymbol{a}_i \in \mathcal{A}_i} u_i(\boldsymbol{a}_{-i}, \boldsymbol{a}_i) \right)$$

Example

	Α	В	С
Α	1,1	0,0	2,3
В	0,0	1,2	1,2
С	0,2	2,3	3,1

For general strategic game, the payoff player *i* can guarantee in any period is her minmax payoff

$$v_i = \min_{\boldsymbol{a}_{-i} \in \mathcal{A}_{-i}} \left( \max_{\boldsymbol{a}_i \in \mathcal{A}_i} u_i(\boldsymbol{a}_{-i}, \boldsymbol{a}_i) \right)$$

Example

	A	В	С
Α	1,1	0,0	2,3
В	0,0	1,2	1,2
С	0,2	2,3	3,1

► *v*<sub>1</sub> = 1

For general strategic game, the payoff player *i* can guarantee in any period is her minmax payoff

$$v_i = \min_{a_{-i} \in A_{-i}} \left( \max_{a_i \in A_i} u_i(a_{-i}, a_i) \right)$$

Example

	A	В	С
Α	1,1	0,0	2,3
В	0,0	1,2	1,2
С	0,2	2,3	3,1

► *v*<sub>1</sub> = 1

For general strategic game, the payoff player *i* can guarantee in any period is her minmax payoff

$$v_i = \min_{\boldsymbol{a}_{-i} \in \mathcal{A}_{-i}} \left( \max_{\boldsymbol{a}_i \in \mathcal{A}_i} u_i(\boldsymbol{a}_{-i}, \boldsymbol{a}_i) \right)$$

Example

	Α	В	С
Α	1,1	0,0	2,3
В	0,0	1,2	1,2
С	0,2	2,3	3,1

For general strategic game, the payoff player *i* can guarantee in any period is her minmax payoff

$$v_i = \min_{a_{-i} \in A_{-i}} \left( \max_{a_i \in A_i} u_i(a_{-i}, a_i) \right)$$

Example

	A	В	С
Α	1,1	0,0	2,3
В	0,0	1,2	1,2
С	0,2	2,3	3,1

► *V*<sub>1</sub> = 1

Note that pair of minmax actions (B, A) is not a Nash equilibrium of this game

For general strategic game, the payoff player *i* can guarantee in any period is her minmax payoff

$$v_i = \min_{a_{-i} \in A_{-i}} \left( \max_{a_i \in A_i} u_i(a_{-i}, a_i) \right)$$

Example

	A	В	С
Α	1,1	0,0	2,3
В	0,0	1,2	1,2
С	0,2	2,3	3,1

► *V*<sub>1</sub> = 1

- Note that pair of minmax actions (B, A) is not a Nash equilibrium of this game
- For Prisoner's Dilemma, v₁ = v₂ = 1, and pair of minmax actions, (C, C), is a Nash equilibrium

- $w_i \ge v_i$  for all  $i \in N \Rightarrow w$  is enforceable
- $w_i > v_i$  for all  $i \in N \Rightarrow w$  is strictly enforceable

- $w_i \ge v_i$  for all  $i \in N \Rightarrow w$  is enforceable
- $w_i > v_i$  for all  $i \in N \Rightarrow w$  is strictly enforceable

#### Proposition

For any strategic game *G* and any discount factor  $\delta$ , every Nash equilibrium payoff profile of the  $\delta$ -discounted infinitely repeated game of *G* is an enforceable payoff profile of *G* 

- $w_i \ge v_i$  for all  $i \in N \Rightarrow w$  is enforceable
- $w_i > v_i$  for all  $i \in N \Rightarrow w$  is strictly enforceable

#### Proposition

For any strategic game *G* and any discount factor  $\delta$ , every Nash equilibrium payoff profile of the  $\delta$ -discounted infinitely repeated game of *G* is an enforceable payoff profile of *G* 

#### Idea of proof

Every player *i* can get at least  $v_i$  in every period by choosing an action in the period that best responds to the other players' actions

Fix strategy profile s

- Fix strategy profile s
- Define strategy s'<sub>i</sub> of player i: for every h

- Fix strategy profile s
- Define strategy s'<sub>i</sub> of player i: for every h

 $s'_i(h) =$  best response to  $s_{-i}(h)$ 

▶ By definition of  $v_i$ ,  $u_i(s_{-i}(h), s'_i(h)) \ge v_i$  for every h

- Fix strategy profile s
- Define strategy s'<sub>i</sub> of player i: for every h

- ▶ By definition of  $v_i$ ,  $u_i(s_{-i}(h), s'_i(h)) \ge v_i$  for every h
- $\Rightarrow$  *i*'s discounted average payoff to  $(s_{-i}, s'_i)$  is  $\geq v_i$

- Fix strategy profile s
- Define strategy s'<sub>i</sub> of player i: for every h

- ▶ By definition of  $v_i$ ,  $u_i(s_{-i}(h), s'_i(h)) \ge v_i$  for every h
- $\Rightarrow$  *i*'s discounted average payoff to  $(s_{-i}, s'_i)$  is  $\geq v_i$
- ⇒ For s to be a Nash equilibrium of repeated game we need *i*'s payoff  $\geq v_i$

- Fix strategy profile s
- Define strategy s'<sub>i</sub> of player i: for every h

- ▶ By definition of  $v_i$ ,  $u_i(s_{-i}(h), s'_i(h)) \ge v_i$  for every h
- $\Rightarrow$  *i*'s discounted average payoff to  $(s_{-i}, s'_i)$  is  $\geq v_i$
- ⇒ For *s* to be a Nash equilibrium of repeated game we need *i*'s payoff  $\geq v_i$
- ⇒ Every Nash equilibrium payoff profile is enforceable

When players are very patient, set of Nash equilibrium payoff profiles essentially = set of enforceable payoff profiles

When players are very patient, set of Nash equilibrium payoff profiles essentially = set of enforceable payoff profiles

#### Proposition (Nash folk theorem)

Let *w* be a strictly enforceable payoff profile of a strategic game *G*. For all  $\varepsilon > 0$  there exists  $\underline{\delta} < 1$  such that if  $\delta > \underline{\delta}$  then the  $\delta$ -discounted infinitely repeated game of *G* has a Nash equilibrium whose payoff profile *w*' satisfies  $|w' - w| < \varepsilon$ .

## Nash equilibrium payoffs

When players are very patient, set of Nash equilibrium payoff profiles essentially = set of enforceable payoff profiles

#### Proposition (Nash folk theorem)

Let *w* be a strictly enforceable payoff profile of a strategic game *G*. For all  $\varepsilon > 0$  there exists  $\underline{\delta} < 1$  such that if  $\delta > \underline{\delta}$  then the  $\delta$ -discounted infinitely repeated game of *G* has a Nash equilibrium whose payoff profile *w*' satisfies  $|w' - w| < \varepsilon$ .

#### Idea of proof

If any player *j* deviates, other players hold *j* down to her minmax payoff  $v_j$  subsequently

Let w be strictly enforceable payoff profile

- Let w be strictly enforceable payoff profile
- ⇒ We can find outcome path  $((a^1, a^2, ..., a^k), (a^1, a^2, ..., a^k),$ ...) of repeated game (where  $a^t$  is action profile of *G* for t = 1, ..., k) for which payoff profile is arbitrarily close to *w*


- Let w be strictly enforceable payoff profile
- ⇒ We can find outcome path  $((a^1, a^2, ..., a^k), (a^1, a^2, ..., a^k),$ ...) of repeated game (where  $a^t$  is action profile of *G* for t = 1, ..., k) for which payoff profile is arbitrarily close to *w*
- For each player *j*, let *p*<sub>-*j*</sub> be a list of actions of the other players that holds *j*'s payoff to its minmax value, *v<sub>j</sub>*:


$$p_{-j} \in \operatorname*{arg\,min}_{a_{-j} \in A_{-j}} \left( \max_{a_j \in A_j} u_j(a_{-j}, a_j) \right)$$

- Let w be strictly enforceable payoff profile
- ⇒ We can find outcome path  $((a^1, a^2, ..., a^k), (a^1, a^2, ..., a^k),$ ...) of repeated game (where  $a^t$  is action profile of *G* for t = 1, ..., k) for which payoff profile is arbitrarily close to *w* 
  - For each player *j*, let *p*<sub>-*j*</sub> be a list of actions of the other players that holds *j*'s payoff to its minmax value, *v<sub>j</sub>*:


$$p_{-j} \in \operatorname*{arg\,min}_{a_{-j} \in \mathcal{A}_{-j}} \left( \max_{a_j \in \mathcal{A}_j} u_j(a_{-j}, a_j) \right)$$


Suppose each player *i* uses strategy that chooses her action in outcome path till first period in which a single player *j* ≠ *i* deviates, after which it chooses action (*p*<sub>−*j*</sub>)<sub>*i*</sub>







No player deviates from  $a^1$  or Pi alone deviates from  $a^1$  or  $\geq 2$  players deviate from  $a^1$ 






No player deviates from  $a^2$  or Pi alone deviates from  $a^2$  or  $\geq 2$  players deviate from  $a^2$ 











P(i-1) alone deviates from  $a^1$ 

P(i-1) is "punished" forever









### Proof concluded

The resulting strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium when players are sufficiently patient because any player *j* who deviates gets at most v<sub>j</sub> in every period following her deviation

### Proof concluded

- The resulting strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium when players are sufficiently patient because any player *j* who deviates gets at most v<sub>j</sub> in every period following her deviation
- Note that we do not need to worry about more than one player deviating in a period, because Nash equilibrium requires only that no *single* player can increase her payoff by deviating

# Nash equilibrium payoffs of infinitely repeated *Prisoner's Dilemma*

Result implies that set of payoff pairs to Nash equilibria of infinitely repeated *Prisoner's Dilemma* is approximated, for  $\delta$  close to 1, by shaded region in figure

