ECO2030: Microeconomic Theory II, module 1

Lecture 12

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- Extensive game with perfect information: players perfectly informed about *past* actions

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

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

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

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

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

Set of actions available to player 2 at each history in her information set is the same (if not, she could deduce player 1's action from set of available actions)

Extensive games with imperfect information

- Example with chance move:



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

Challenger is Strong with probability p and Weak with probability $1-p$, and knows her type. In each case she has two actions, *Ready* and *Unready*.

Extensive games with imperfect information

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

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

Incumbent knows Challenger's action, but not her type

Extensive games with imperfect information

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

$$\mathcal{I}_{\text{Incumbent}} = \{\{(Strong, Ready), (Weak, Ready)\}, \{(Strong, Unready), (Weak, Unready)\}\}$$

Extensive games with imperfect information

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- A function $P : H \setminus Z(H) \to N \cup \{c\}$ (*player function*, specifying player or chance, c, who moves after each nonterminal history)

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$f_c(a|h)$ is the probability that action a is chosen after the history h

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- For each player $i \in N$ a partition $\mathcal{I}_i$ of $\{h \in H : P(h) = i\}$ with $A(h) = A(h')$ whenever h and h' are in the same member of the partition (i's *information partition*)

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- Condition $A(h) = A(h')$ for h and h' in the same member of the partition means that i cannot deduce, from set of actions available to her, whether history is h or h'
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- For each player $i \in N$ a preference relation $\succsim_i$ on lotteries over $Z(H)$ represented by expected value of payoff function

Extensive games with imperfect information

Example



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

Models same situation as

- strategic game in which players 1 and 2 choose actions simultaneously

Extensive games with imperfect information

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

Models same situation as

- strategic game in which players 1 and 2 choose actions simultaneously
- extensive game with perfect information and simultaneous moves in which players 1 and 2 move simultaneously

Extensive games with imperfect information

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

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

Models same situation as

- extensive game with perfect information and simultaneous moves in which player 1 moves and then players 1 and 2 move simultaneously

Extensive games with imperfect information

Example



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

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

- Player 1 does not know whether she is the first mover or whether she is moving after the other players have moved

Extensive games with imperfect information

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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These games have *imperfect recall*

Extensive games with imperfect information

Perfect recall

- Game has perfect recall if at every point every player remembers whatever she knew in the past

Extensive games with imperfect information

Perfect recall

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- Will restrict throughout to games with perfect recall

Strategies

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- Given set of strategies for each player, can define strategic form of extensive game as before

Strategies

Example



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

Pure strategy of incumbent specifies actions as each of her two information sets, so 4 pure strategies:

Strategies

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

- Player 1's pure strategies: AE, AF, BE, BF
- Mixed strategy of player 1 is probability distribution (p_1, p_2, p_3, p_4) over these four strategies $(p_1 + p_2 + p_3 + p_4 = 1)$

Behavioral strategies

A behavioral strategy of player i is a collection $(\beta_i(I_i))_{I_i \in \mathcal{I}_i}$ of independent probability measures, where $\beta_i(I_i)$ is a probability distribution over $A(I_i)$

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

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

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

Behavioral strategy of player 1 is pair $((p_1, p_2), (q_1, q_2))$:

- p_1 and p_2 are probabilities assigned to A and B at start of game ($p_1 + p_2 = 1$)
- q_1 and q_2 are probabilities assigned to E and F at player 1's second information set ($q_1 + q_2 = 1$)

Mixed and behavioral strategies

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Mixed and behavioral strategies

- Mixed and behavioral strategies are different ways of formulating a player's randomization
- However, they are closely related
- Say two (mixed or behavioral) strategies of a player are outcome-equivalent if for every collection of pure strategies of the other players the two strategies induce the same probability distribution over terminal histories

Mixed and behavioral strategies

Example



Mixed and behavioral strategies

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

Claim: For every behavioral strategy of player 1 there is a mixed strategy that is outcome-equivalent

Mixed and behavioral strategies

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

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Behavioral

$A : p_1$

$B : p_2$

$E : q_1$

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$\Rightarrow$

Mixed and behavioral strategies

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

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Behavioral		Mixed
$A : p_1$		AE :
$B : p_2$	$\Rightarrow$	AF :
$E : q_1$		BE :
$F : q_2$		BF :

Mixed and behavioral strategies

Example



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

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

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

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$A : p_1$ $B : p_2$ $E : q_1$ $F : q_2$	$\Rightarrow$	$AE : p_1 q_1$ $AF : p_1 q_2$ $BE : p_2 q_1$ $BF : p_2 q_2$

Mixed and behavioral strategies

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

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

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Mixed and behavioral strategies

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

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

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Mixed		Behavioral
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

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

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

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Let Γ be a finite extensive game with perfect recall.

- For any behavioral strategy of a player in Γ there is an outcome-equivalent mixed strategy.

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Subsequently we restrict attention to games with perfect recall and work with behavioral strategies

Nash equilibrium

- For any profile of mixed strategies, let $O(\sigma)$ be the outcome of σ: the probability distribution over terminal histories generated by σ

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Definition

A Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies of an extensive game $\langle N, H, P, f_c, (\mathcal{I}_i), (\succsim_i)\rangle$ is a profile σ of mixed strategies such that for all $i \in N$

$O(\sigma^*_{-i}, \sigma^*_i) \succsim_i O(\sigma^*_{-i}, \sigma_i)$ for every mixed strategy σ_i of player i

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A Nash equilibrium in behavioral strategies is defined similarly

Nash equilibrium

Example



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

- One Nash equilibrium:

Nash equilibrium

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

- One Nash equilibrium: (M, L)

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Example



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

- Another Nash equilibrium: (L, R)

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

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

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

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

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  - This NE *is* subgame perfect: the game has no proper subgame
  - We need new refinement of NE

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

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

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

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

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

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

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  - Need to specify player 2's belief as part of equilibrium

Beliefs and assessments

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- Restrict to games with perfect recall in which every information set contains finite number of histories

An assessment in an extensive game is pair (β, μ) where β is a profile of behavioral strategies and μ is a belief system

Equilibrium

Sequential rationality

Each player's strategy is optimal given her beliefs

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Sequential rationality

An assessment (β, μ) is sequentially rational if for every player i and every information set $I_i \in \mathcal{I}_i$ the strategy β_i of player i is a best response to the other players' strategies β_{-i} given i's beliefs $\mu(I_i)$ at I_i

Equilibrium

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$$\mu(I_i)(h^*) = \frac{\Pr(h^* \text{ according to } \beta)}{\sum_{h \in I_i} \Pr(h \text{ according to } \beta)}$$

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- Note that this condition imposes *no* restriction of beliefs at information sets not reached if players follow β

Equilibrium

Weak consistency



Equilibrium

Weak consistency



- An assessment in which player 1 chooses *L* and player 2 holds *any* belief at her information set is weakly consistent because given player 1's strategy, player 2's information set is not reached

Equilibrium

Weak consistency



- An assessment in which player 1 chooses *L* and player 2 holds *any* belief at her information set is weakly consistent because given player 1's strategy, player 2's information set is not reached
- If $p_2 + p_3 > 0$ then weak consistency requires that player 2's belief assign probability $p_2/(p_2 + p_3)$ to *M* and probability $p_3/(p_2 + p_3)$ to *R*

Equilibrium

Definition

An assessment is a weak sequential equilibrium of a finite extensive game with perfect recall if it is sequentially rational and weakly consistent

- MWG use the term *weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium*

Equilibrium

Example 1



Equilibrium

Example 1



- Start by looking at P2’s choice

Equilibrium

Example 1



- Start by looking at P2's choice
- For *any* belief at P2's information set, only L is optimal

Equilibrium

Example 1



- Start by looking at P2's choice
- For *any* belief at P2's information set, only L is optimal
- So in any WSE P2 chooses L

Equilibrium

Example 1



- Start by looking at P2's choice
- For *any* belief at P2's information set, only L is optimal
- So in any WSE P2 chooses L
- Given that P2 chooses L, P1's optimal action is M

Equilibrium

Example 1



- Start by looking at P2's choice
- For *any* belief at P2's information set, only *L* is optimal
- So in any WSE P2 chooses *L*
- Given that P2 chooses *L*, P1's optimal action is *M*
- What are P2's beliefs at her information set?

Equilibrium

Example 1



- Start by looking at P2's choice
- For *any* belief at P2's information set, only L is optimal
- So in any WSE P2 chooses L
- Given that P2 chooses L, P1's optimal action is M
- What are P2's beliefs at her information set?
- Weak consistency $\Rightarrow q = 1$

Equilibrium

Example 1



- Start by looking at P2's choice
- For *any* belief at P2's information set, only L is optimal
- So in any WSE P2 chooses L
- Given that P2 chooses L, P1's optimal action is M
- What are P2's beliefs at her information set?
- Weak consistency $\Rightarrow q = 1$
- So unique WSE, with strategies (M, L) and beliefs $(1, 0)$

Equilibrium

Example 2



Equilibrium

Example 2



- Start by looking at P2's choice

Equilibrium

Example 2



- Start by looking at P2's choice
- If $q > \frac{1}{2}$ then L is only optimal action; if $q < \frac{1}{2}$ then R is only optimal action; if $q = \frac{1}{2}$ then both L and R are optimal

Equilibrium

Example 2



- Start by looking at P2's choice
- If $q > \frac{1}{2}$ then L is only optimal action; if $q < \frac{1}{2}$ then R is only optimal action; if $q = \frac{1}{2}$ then both L and R are optimal
- If P2 chooses L then P1

Equilibrium

Example 2



- Start by looking at P2's choice
- If $q > \frac{1}{2}$ then L is only optimal action; if $q < \frac{1}{2}$ then R is only optimal action; if $q = \frac{1}{2}$ then both L and R are optimal
- If P2 chooses L then P1 chooses M

Equilibrium

Example 2



- Start by looking at P2's choice
- If $q > \frac{1}{2}$ then L is only optimal action; if $q < \frac{1}{2}$ then R is only optimal action; if $q = \frac{1}{2}$ then both L and R are optimal
- If P2 chooses L then P1 chooses $M \Rightarrow$ beliefs

Equilibrium

Example 2



- Start by looking at P2's choice
- If $q > \frac{1}{2}$ then L is only optimal action; if $q < \frac{1}{2}$ then R is only optimal action; if $q = \frac{1}{2}$ then both L and R are optimal
- If P2 chooses L then P1 chooses $M \Rightarrow$ beliefs $(1, 0)$

Equilibrium

Example 2



- Start by looking at P2's choice
- If $q > \frac{1}{2}$ then L is only optimal action; if $q < \frac{1}{2}$ then R is only optimal action; if $q = \frac{1}{2}$ then both L and R are optimal
- If P2 chooses L then P1 chooses $M \Rightarrow$ beliefs $(1, 0) \Rightarrow L$ is optimal $\Rightarrow$ assessment $((M, L), (1, 0))$ is WSE

Equilibrium

Example 2



- Start by looking at P2's choice
- If $q > \frac{1}{2}$ then L is only optimal action; if $q < \frac{1}{2}$ then R is only optimal action; if $q = \frac{1}{2}$ then both L and R are optimal
- If P2 chooses L then P1 chooses M $\Rightarrow$ beliefs $(1, 0)$ $\Rightarrow$ L is optimal $\Rightarrow$ assessment $((M, L), (1, 0))$ is WSE
- If P2 chooses R then P1

Equilibrium

Example 2



- Start by looking at P2's choice
- If $q > \frac{1}{2}$ then L is only optimal action; if $q < \frac{1}{2}$ then R is only optimal action; if $q = \frac{1}{2}$ then both L and R are optimal
- If P2 chooses L then P1 chooses $M \Rightarrow$ beliefs $(1, 0) \Rightarrow L$ is optimal $\Rightarrow$ assessment $((M, L), (1, 0))$ is WSE
- If P2 chooses R then P1 chooses L

Equilibrium

Example 2



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- If P2 chooses L then P1 chooses $M \Rightarrow$ beliefs $(1, 0) \Rightarrow L$ is optimal $\Rightarrow$ assessment $((M, L), (1, 0))$ is WSE
- If P2 chooses R then P1 chooses $L \Rightarrow$ beliefs

Equilibrium

Example 2



- Start by looking at P2's choice
- If $q > \frac{1}{2}$ then L is only optimal action; if $q < \frac{1}{2}$ then R is only optimal action; if $q = \frac{1}{2}$ then both L and R are optimal
- If P2 chooses L then P1 chooses $M \Rightarrow$ beliefs $(1, 0) \Rightarrow L$ is optimal $\Rightarrow$ assessment $((M, L), (1, 0))$ is WSE
- If P2 chooses R then P1 chooses $L \Rightarrow$ beliefs unrestricted by weak consistency; need $q \leq \frac{1}{2}$ for R to be optimal

Equilibrium

Example 2



- Start by looking at P2's choice
- If $q > \frac{1}{2}$ then L is only optimal action; if $q < \frac{1}{2}$ then R is only optimal action; if $q = \frac{1}{2}$ then both L and R are optimal
- If P2 chooses L then P1 chooses M $\Rightarrow$ beliefs $(1, 0)$ $\Rightarrow$ L is optimal $\Rightarrow$ assessment $((M, L), (1, 0))$ is WSE
- If P2 chooses R then P1 chooses L $\Rightarrow$ beliefs unrestricted by weak consistency; need $q \leq \frac{1}{2}$ for R to be optimal $\Rightarrow$ any assessment $((L, R), (q, 1-q))$ with $q \leq \frac{1}{2}$ is WSE

Equilibrium

Example 3



Equilibrium

Example 3



- Consider assessment in which P1's strategy is (L, R), P2's strategy is L, and P2's belief is $(1, 0)$

Equilibrium

Example 3



- Consider assessment in which P1's strategy is (L, R), P2's strategy is L, and P2's belief is $(1, 0)$
- P1's strategy is optimal (payoffs to other strategies ≤ 1)

Equilibrium

Example 3



- Consider assessment in which P1's strategy is (L, R), P2's strategy is L, and P2's belief is $(1, 0)$
- P1's strategy is optimal (payoffs to other strategies ≤ 1)
- P2's strategy is optimal given her belief

Equilibrium

Example 3



- Consider assessment in which P1's strategy is (L, R), P2's strategy is L, and P2's belief is $(1, 0)$
- P1's strategy is optimal (payoffs to other strategies ≤ 1)
- P2's strategy is optimal given her belief
- P2's belief does not violate weak consistency because information set is not reached

Equilibrium

Example 3



- Consider assessment in which P1's strategy is (L, R), P2's strategy is L, and P2's belief is $(1, 0)$
- P1's strategy is optimal (payoffs to other strategies ≤ 1)
- P2's strategy is optimal given her belief
- P2's belief does not violate weak consistency because information set is not reached
- So assessment is WSE

Equilibrium

Example 3



- Is assessment an SPE?

Equilibrium

Example 3



- Is assessment an SPE?
- No! In subgame following C, L is not optimal for P2 given P1's strategy

Equilibrium

Example 3



- Is assessment an SPE?
- No! In subgame following C, L is not optimal for P2 given P1's strategy
- Problem is that P2's belief in the WSE isn't derived from P1's strategy *in the subgame*—weak consistency doesn't require it to be because the subgame is not reached if P1 follows her strategy

Equilibrium

Example 4



Equilibrium

Example 4



- Consider indicated assessment

Equilibrium

Example 4



- Consider indicated assessment
- P1's strategy

Equilibrium

Example 4



- Consider indicated assessment
- P1’s strategy is optimal given her belief

Equilibrium

Example 4



- Consider indicated assessment
- P1’s strategy is optimal given her belief
- P2’s strategy

Equilibrium

Example 4



- Consider indicated assessment
- P1's strategy is optimal given her belief
- P2's strategy is optimal given her belief (payoff to L is $\frac{3}{4} \cdot 1 + \frac{1}{4} \cdot 0 = \frac{3}{4}$, payoff to R is $\frac{3}{4} \cdot 0 + \frac{1}{4} \cdot 2 = \frac{1}{2}$)

Equilibrium

Example 4



- Belief at P1’s information set

Equilibrium

Example 4



- Belief at P1's information set is consistent with move of chance

Equilibrium

Example 4



- Belief at P1's information set is consistent with move of chance
- Belief at P2's information set

Equilibrium

Example 4



- Belief at P1's information set is consistent with move of chance
- Belief at P2's information set does not violate weak consistency because information set is not reached

Equilibrium

Example 4



- Belief at P1's information set is consistent with move of chance
- Belief at P2's information set does not violate weak consistency because information set is not reached
- So assessment is WSE

Equilibrium

Example 4



- But belief at P2's information set cannot be derived from any *alternative* strategy of P1

Equilibrium

Example 4



- But belief at P2's information set cannot be derived from any *alternative* strategy of P1
  - If P1 uses strategy $(p, 1-p)$ with $0 \leq p < 1$ then belief at P2's information set is $(\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})$

Equilibrium

Example 4



- But belief at P2's information set cannot be derived from any *alternative* strategy of P1
  - If P1 uses strategy $(p, 1-p)$ with $0 \le p < 1$ then belief at P2's information set is $(\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})$
- And for every belief at P2's information set that *is* derived from a strategy of P1, R is optimal for P2, so that B, not A, is optimal for P1

Equilibrium

Example 4



- *Conclusion*: Although assessment is WSE, it does not seem reasonable, and in no reasonable equilibrium does P1 choose *A*

Consistent belief system

- Examples 4 and 5 suggest we need to strengthen weak consistency and restrict beliefs at information sets not reached in equilibrium

Consistent belief system

- Examples 4 and 5 suggest we need to strengthen weak consistency and restrict beliefs at information sets not reached in equilibrium
- One possibility: require that there exist *some* sequence of assessments converging to (β, μ) in which every strategy β_i assigns positive probability to every action of player i and μ is derived from β by Bayes' rule

Consistent belief system

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Definition

An assessment (β, μ) is consistent if there is a sequence $((\beta^n, \mu^n))_{n=1}^{\infty}$ of assessments that converges to (β, μ) in Euclidian space and has the properties that each strategy profile β^n is completely mixed and that each belief system μ^n is derived from β^n using Bayes' rule

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Note: The strategy profiles β^n in the sequence are not required to be optimal with respect to any beliefs

Sequential equilibrium

Definition

An assessment is a sequential equilibrium of a finite extensive game with perfect recall if it is sequentially rational and consistent

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- In an extensive game with perfect information (β, μ) is a sequential equilibrium if and only if β is a subgame perfect equilibrium
- In any extensive game with perfect recall the strategy profile in any sequential equilibrium is a subgame perfect equilibrium

Sequential equilibrium

Example 3 revisited



- Is this assessment, say (β, μ), a sequential equilibrium?

Sequential equilibrium

Example 3 revisited



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Sequential equilibrium

Example 3 revisited



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- Suppose P1's strategy is completely mixed and close to β_1

Sequential equilibrium

Example 3 revisited



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

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- Then P2's belief, by Bayes' Law, assigns probability

Sequential equilibrium

Example 3 revisited



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Sequential equilibrium

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

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- Then P2's belief, by Bayes' Law, assigns probability ε to (C, M) and probability $1 - \varepsilon$ to (C, R)
- P2's optimal action given this belief is R, not L

Sequential equilibrium

Example 3 revisited



Conclusion

- No sequence of assessments in which strategies are completely mixed and beliefs are derived from strategies using Bayes' Law converges to (β, μ)

Sequential equilibrium

Example 3 revisited



Conclusion

- No sequence of assessments in which strategies are completely mixed and beliefs are derived from strategies using Bayes' Law converges to (β, μ)
- So (β, μ) is *not* a sequential equilibrium

Equilibrium

Example 2 revisited



- Is this assessment, say (β, μ), a sequential equilibrium?

Equilibrium

Example 2 revisited



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Example 2 revisited



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Equilibrium

Example 2 revisited



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- Suppose P1's strategy is completely mixed and close to β_1
- Then P2's belief assigns probability

Equilibrium

Example 2 revisited



- Is this assessment, say (β, μ), a sequential equilibrium?
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- Suppose P1's strategy is completely mixed and close to β_1
- Then P2's belief assigns probability $(1-\varepsilon)/(1-\varepsilon/2)$ to *M* and probability $(\varepsilon/2)/(1-\varepsilon/2)$ to *R*

Equilibrium

Example 2 revisited



- P2's best response to this belief is

Equilibrium

Example 2 revisited



- P2's best response to this belief is L

Equilibrium

Example 2 revisited



- P2's best response to this belief is L
- Thus the sequence $(\beta^n, \mu^n)_{n=1}^{\infty}$ of assessments in which

$$\beta_1^n(\varnothing) = (\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon^n, 1-\varepsilon^n, \tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon^n)$$

Equilibrium

Example 2 revisited



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$$\beta_1^n(\varnothing) = (\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon^n, 1-\varepsilon^n, \tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon^n)$$
$$\beta_2^n(\{M, R\}) = (1-\varepsilon^n, \varepsilon^n)$$

Equilibrium

Example 2 revisited



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satisfies conditions in definition of sequential equilibrium

Equilibrium

Example 2 revisited



- P2's best response to this belief is L
- Thus the sequence $(\beta^n, \mu^n)_{n=1}^{\infty}$ of assessments in which
$$\beta_1^n(\varnothing) = (\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon^n, 1 - \varepsilon^n, \tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon^n)$$
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satisfies conditions in definition of sequential equilibrium
- So indicated assessment satisfies conditions $\Rightarrow$ assessment $((M, L), (1, 0))$ is sequential equilibrium

Equilibrium

Example 4 revisited



- For every strategy of P1 that assigns positive probability to *B*, belief at P2's information set derived by Bayes' Law is $(\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})$

Equilibrium

Example 4 revisited



- For every strategy of P1 that assigns positive probability to *B*, belief at P2's information set derived by Bayes' Law is $(\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})$
- For this belief, only *R* is optimal for P2

Equilibrium

Example 4 revisited



- For every strategy of P1 that assigns positive probability to *B*, belief at P2's information set derived by Bayes' Law is $(\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})$
- For this belief, only *R* is optimal for P2
- Given that P2 chooses *R*, only *B* is optimal for P1

Equilibrium

Example 4 revisited



- For every strategy of P1 that assigns positive probability to B, belief at P2's information set derived by Bayes' Law is $(\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})$
- For this belief, only R is optimal for P2
- Given that P2 chooses R, only B is optimal for P1
- So in any sequential equilibrium, P1 chooses B (and not A)

Sequential equilibrium

Summary

- *Weak sequential equilibrium* requires strategies to be optimal given beliefs and beliefs to be derived from strategies at information sets reached with positive probability when players follow strategies

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- *Weak sequential equilibrium* requires strategies to be optimal given beliefs and beliefs to be derived from strategies at information sets reached with positive probability when players follow strategies
- Does not restrict beliefs at information sets not reached when players follow strategies
- Examples show that absence of restriction at such information sets leads to equilibria that seem unreasonable
- *Sequential equilibrium* imposes a restriction that rules out the unreasonable equilibria in the examples, although the meaning of the condition is not very clear