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Schedule

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The class meets MW9-11 in WW119 (M), WW121 (W). The tutorial session meets R6-8 in BA1200 during the first six weeks of the semester.

I will post slides for each class at latest the day before the class. The compact versions are best for printing, the complete ones best for viewing on a screen.

Class 1
Nash equilibrium (Sections 2.1–2.3 of "A Course in Game Theory").
Class 2
Nash equilibrium continued (Section 2.4); introduction to mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (Section 3.1). [Section 2.5 will be omitted; I will return to the material in Section 2.6.]

Class 3
Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium continued. [Read Section 3.2. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 will be omitted.] Rationalizability and iterated elimination of strictly dominated actions (Section 4.2). Introduction to Bayesian games (Section 2.6).
Class 4
Bayesian games continued (Section 2.6); electronic mail game (Section 5.5); purification of mixed strategy equilbria (Sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4)

Class 5
Auctions; juries
Class 6
Extensive games with perfect information: strategies, Nash equilibrium, subgame perfect equilibrium, the one deviation property (Sections 6.1, 6.2).
Class 7
Extensive games with perfect information: backward induction; Stackelberg games; ultimatum game; holdup game; adding chance moves and simultaneous moves (Section 6.3); Chain-Store game (Section 6.5.1).
Class 8
Bargaining theory: bargaining game of alternating offers (Chapter 7, omitting the proof of uniqueness in Proposition 122.1 and Section 7.4.3).

Class 9
Nash bargaining solution (Sections 15.1, 15.2 (using the approach on pp. 308–309), 15.3). Relation between Nash solution and subgame perfect equilibrium of bargaining game of alternating offers (Section 15.4). Outside options in the bargaining game of alternating offers (Section 7.4.3).
Class 10
Repeated games (Sections 8.1–8.5 (preferences with discounting only)).

Class 11
Repeated games: Subgame perfect equilibrium (Section 8.8), finitely repeated games (Section 8.10).
Class 12
Extensive games with imperfect information: Introduction (Sections 11.1, 11.4, 11.5, 12.1–12.3).