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The class meets M 15:00-18:00 in AS4-0119.
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Class 1
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Sincere voting
Topics
Two alternatives: majority rule. Three of more alternatives: plurality rule, nonexistence of voting rule with desirable properties, Condorcet-consistent rules, scoring rules. Single-peaked preferences. Multidimensional alternatives.
References
- Arrow, Kenneth J., Social choice and individual values (Second edition), Yale University Press, New Haven, Connecticut, 1963
- Moulin, Hervé, Axioms of cooperative decision making, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988
- May, Kenneth O., "A set of independent necessary and sufficient conditions for simple majority decision", Econometrica, 20 (1952), 680–684
- Austen-Smith, David and Banks, Jeffrey S., Positive political theory I, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1999
- Blair, Douglas H. and Bordes, Georges and Kelly, Jerry S. and Suzumura, Kotaro, "Impossibility theorems without collective rationality", Journal of Economic Theory, 13 (1976), 361–379
- Fishburn, Peter C., "Inverted orders for monotone scoring rules", Discrete Applied Mathematics, 3 (1981), 27–36
- Young, H. Peyton, "Social choice scoring functions", SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics, 28 (1975), 824–838
- Black, Duncan, The theory of committees and elections, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1958
- Enelow, James M. and Hinich, Melvin J., The spatial theory of voting, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984 (Chapter 3)
- Recent paper
- Item @krishnamorgan2014 not found in verified citations database
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Class 2
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Strategic voting
Topics
Costless voting: Nash equilibrium and weak domination. Costly voting: pure and mixed Nash equilibria. Models of turnout in large elections.
References
- Palfrey, Thomas R. and Rosenthal, Howard, "A strategic calculus of voting", Public Choice, 41 (1983), 7–53
- Ledyard, John O., "The paradox of voting and candidate competition: a general equilibrium analysis", in Essays in contemporary fields of economics, eds. Horwich, George and Quirk, James P., Purdue University Press, West Lafayette, Indiana, 1981, 54–80
- Myerson, Roger B., "Population uncertainty and Poisson games", International Journal of Game Theory, 27 (1998), 375–392 (Section 7)
- Good, I. J. and Mayer, Lawrence S., "Estimating the efficacy of a vote", Behavioral Science, 20 (1975), 25–33
- Chamberlain, Gary and Rothschild, Michael, "A note on the probability of casting a decisive vote", Journal of Economic Theory, 25 (1981), 152–162
- Myatt, David P., "A rational choice theory of voter turnout", Unpublished paper, 2012
- Recent papers
- Bouton, Laurent, "A theory of strategic voting in runoff elections", American Economic Review, 103 (2013), 1248–1288
- Myatt, David P., "On the theory of strategic voting", Review of Economic Studies, 74 (2007), 255–281
- Martinelli, César, "Simple plurality versus plurality runoff with privately informed voters", Social Choice and Welfare, 19 (2002), 901–919
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Class 3
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Turnout in large elections. Electoral competition.
Topics
Group-based models of turnout in large elections; models of ethical voters. Hotelling’s model of office-motivated candidates: one-dimensional policies with two parties; electing a legislature; multidimensional policies; equilibrium with many parties
References
- Morton, Rebecca B., "Groups in rational turnout models", American Journal of Political Science, 35 (1991), 758–776
- Shachar, Ron and Nalebuff, Barry, "Follow the leader: theory and evidence on political participation", American Economic Review, 89 (1999), 525–547
- Coate, Stephen and Conlin, Michael, "A group rule-utilitarian approach to voter turnout: theory and evidence", American Economic Review, 94 (2004), 1476–1504
- Feddersen, Timothy J. and Sandroni, Alvaro, "A theory of participation in elections", American Economic Review, 96 (2006), 1271–1282
- Feddersen, Timothy J. and Sandroni, Alvaro, "Companion to 'A theory of participation in elections'", Unpublished paper, 2015
- Hotelling, Harold, "Stability in competition", Economic Journal, 39 (1929), 41–57
- Downs, Anthony, An economic theory of democracy, Harper and Row, New York, 1957
- Austen-Smith, David, "Two-party competition with many constituencies", Mathematical Social Sciences, 7 (1984), 177–198
- Osborne, Martin J., "Candidate positioning and entry in a political competition", Games and Economic Behavior, 5 (1993), 133–151
- Davis, Otto A. and DeGroot, Morris H. and Hinich, Melvin J., "Social preference orderings and majority rule", Econometrica, 40 (1972), 147–157
- Osborne, Martin J., "Spatial models of political competition under plurality rule: a survey of some explanations of the number of candidates and the positions they take", Canadian Journal of Economics, 28 (1995), 261–301
- Roemer, John E., Political competition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2001
- Recent papers
- Börgers, Tilman, "Costly voting", American Economic Review, 94 (2004), 57–66
- Krasa, Stefan and Polborn, Mattias K., "Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?", Games and Economic Behavior, 66 (2009), 275–291
- Bernhardt, Dan and Duggan, John and Squintani, Francesco, "Electoral competition with privately-informed candidates", Games and Economic Behavior, 58 (2007), 1–29
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Class 4
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Electoral competition continued
Topics
Policy-motivated parties. Citizen-candidate model. Dynamic models
References
- Calvert, Randall L., "Robustness of the multidimensional voting model: candidate motivations, uncertainty, and convergence", American Political Science Review, 29 (1985), 69–95
- Wittman, Donald, "Candidates with policy preferences: a dynamic model", Journal of Economic Theory, 14 (1977), 180–189
- Osborne, Martin J. and Slivinski, Al, "A model of political competition with citizen-candidates", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111 (1996), 65–96
- Besley, Timothy and Coate, Stephen, "An economic model of representative democracy", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112 (1997), 85–114
- Osborne, Martin J., "Candidate positioning and entry in a political competition", Games and Economic Behavior, 5 (1993), 133–151
- Recent paper
- Forand, Jean Guillaume, "Two-party competition with persistent policies", Journal of Economic Theory, 152 (2014), 64–91
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Class 5
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Redistributive politics
Topics
Voting over linear tax systems; voting over nonlinear tax systems; the role of campaign finance.
References
- Romer, Thomas, "Individual welfare, majority voting, and the properties of a linear income tax", Journal of Public Economics, 4 (1975), 163–185
- Roberts, Kevin W. S., "Voting over income tax schedules", Journal of Public Economics, 8 (1977), 329–340
- Meltzer, Allan H. and Richard, Scott F., "A rational theory of the size of government", Journal of Political Economy, 89 (1981), 914–927
- Roemer, John E., "The democratic political economy of progressive income taxation", Econometrica, 67 (1999), 1–19
- Lindbeck, Assar and Weibull, Jörgen W., "Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition", Public Choice, 52 (1987), 273–297
- Campante, Filipe R., "Redistribution in a model of voting and campaign contributions", Journal of Public Economics, 95 (2011), 646–656
- Londregan, John, "Political Income Distribution", in The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, eds. Weingast, Barry R. and Wittman, Donald A., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006, 84–101
- Recent paper
- Feddersen, Timothy J. and Gul, Faruk, "Polarization and income inequality: a dynamic model of unequal democracy", Unpublished paper, 2013
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Class 6
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Legislative bargaining. Voting in the presence of imperfect information. Regime change.
Topics
Legislative bargaining: sequential bargaining under majority rule; buying votes. Voting in the presence of imperfect information: Swing voter's curse. Regime change: democratization
References
- Legislative bargaining
- Austen-Smith, David and Banks, Jeffrey S., Positive political theory II, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 2005 (Chapter 6)
- Gehlbach, Scott, Formal models of domestic politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013 (Chapter 6)
- Baron, David P. and Ferejohn, John A., "Bargaining in legislatures", American Political Science Review, 83 (1989), 1181–1206
- Banks, Jeffrey S. and Duggan, John, "A bargaining model of collective choice", American Political Science Review, 94 (2000), 73–88
- Banks, Jeffrey S. and Duggan, John, "A general bargaining model of legislative policy-making", Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 1 (2006), 49–85
- Diermeier, Daniel and Feddersen, Timothy J., "Cohesion in legislatures and the vote of confidence procedure", American Journal of Political Science, 92 (1998), 611–621
- Groseclose, Tim and Snyder, James M., "Buying supermajorities", American Political Science Review, 90 (1996), 303–315
- Recent paper
- Diermeier, Daniel and Egorov, Georgy and Sonin, Konstantin, "Endogenous property rights", Unpublished paper, Northwestern University, 2013
- Voting in the presence of imperfect information
- Austen-Smith, David and Banks, Jeffrey S., "Information aggregation, rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem", American Political Science Review, 90 (1996), 34–45
- Feddersen, Timothy J. and Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, "The swing voter's curse", American Economic Review, 86 (1996), 408–424
- Feddersen, Timothy J. and Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, "Voting behavior and informative aggregation in elections with private information", Econometrica, 65 (1997), 1029–1058
- Feddersen, Timothy J. and Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, "Abstention in elections with asymmetric information and diverse preferences", American Political Science Review, 93 (1999), 381–398
- Recent paper
- Acharya, Avidit and Meirowitz, Adam, "Informative voting in large elections", Unpublished paper, 2014
- Regime change
- Gehlbach, Scott, Formal models of domestic politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013 (Chapter 8)
- Acemoglu, Daron and Robinson, James A., "Why did the West extend the franchise? Democracy, inequality, and growth in historical perspective", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115 (2000), 1167–1199
- Acemoglu, Daron and Robinson, James A., "A theory of political transitions", American Economic Review, 91 (2001), 938–963
- Acemoglu, Daron and Robinson, James A., Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006
- Lizzeri, Alessandro and Persico, Nicola, "Why did the elites extend the suffrage? Democracy and the scope of government, with an application to Britain's 'Age of Reform'", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119 (2004), 707–765
- Recent paper
- Acemoglu, Daron and Egorov, Georgy and Sonin, Konstantin, "Political economy in a changing world", Working Paper 19158, NBER, 2013