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The class meets MW9-11 in AB 107. The tutorial session meets W2-4 in RT 142 during the first six weeks of the semester. There will be two additional tutorials, on Thursday February 20 and Friday February 21, both from 2:10pm to 4pm in SS1070.

I will post slides for each class at latest the day before the class. The compact versions are best for printing, the complete ones best for viewing on a screen.

Class 1
Nash equilibrium (Sections 2.1–2.3 of "A Course in Game Theory").
Class 2
Nash equilibrium continued (Section 2.4); introduction to mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (Section 3.1). [Section 2.5 will be omitted; I will return to the material in Section 2.6.]
Class 3
Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium continued. [Read Section 3.2. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 will be omitted.] Introduction to Bayesian games (Section 2.6).
Class 4
Bayesian games continued (Section 2.6); electronic mail game (Section 5.5); juries.
Class 5
Class 6
Extensive games with perfect information: strategies, Nash equilibrium, subgame perfect equilibrium, the one deviation property (Sections 6.1, 6.2).
Class 7
Extensive games with perfect information: backward induction; Stackelberg games; ultimatum game; holdup game; adding chance moves and simultaneous moves (Section 6.3); Chain-Store game (Section 6.5.1).
Class 8
Bargaining theory: bargaining game of alternating offers (Chapter 7, omitting the proof of uniqueness in Proposition 122.1 and Section 7.4.3).
Class 9
Nash bargaining solution (Sections 15.1, 15.2 (using the approach on pp. 308–309), 15.3). Relation between Nash solution and subgame perfect equilibrium of bargaining game of alternating offers (Section 15.4). Outside options in the bargaining game of alternating offers (Section 7.4.3).
Class 10
Repeated games (Sections 8.1–8.5 (preferences with discounting only)).
Class 11
Repeated games: Subgame perfect equilibrium (Section 8.8), finitely repeated games (Section 8.10).
Class 12
Extensive games with imperfect information: Introduction (Sections 11.1, 11.4, 11.5, 12.1–12.3).