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The class meets MW2-4 in WO25 (M), UC330 (W). The tutorial session, led by David Walker-Jones, meets R4-6 in HA316 during the first six weeks of the semester, starting on January 11.

I will post slides for each class at latest the day before the class. The compact versions are best for printing, the complete ones best for viewing on a screen.

Class 1 (January 8)
Nash equilibrium (Sections 2.1–2.3 of "A Course in Game Theory").
Class 2 (January 10)
Nash equilibrium continued (Section 2.4); introduction to mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (Section 3.1). [Section 2.5 will be omitted; I will return to the material in Section 2.6.]

Class 3 (January 15)
Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium continued. [Read Section 3.2. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 will be omitted.] Rationalizability and iterated elimination of strictly dominated actions (Section 4.2). Introduction to Bayesian games (Section 2.6).
Class 4 (January 17)
Bayesian games continued (Section 2.6); purification of mixed strategy equilbria (Sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4)

Class 5 (January 22)
Auctions; juries
Class 6 (January 24)
Extensive games with perfect information: strategies, Nash equilibrium, subgame perfect equilibrium, the one deviation property (Sections 6.1, 6.2).

Class 7 (January 29)
Extensive games with perfect information: backward induction; Stackelberg games; ultimatum game; holdup game; adding chance moves and simultaneous moves (Section 6.3); Chain-Store game (Section 6.5.1).
Class 8 (January 31)
Bargaining theory: bargaining game of alternating offers (Chapter 7, omitting the proof of uniqueness in Proposition 122.1).

Class 9 (February 5)
Nash bargaining solution (Sections 15.1, 15.2 (using the approach on pp. 308–309), 15.3). Relation between Nash solution and subgame perfect equilibrium of bargaining game of alternating offers (Section 15.4). Introduction to repeated games.
Class 10 (February 7)
Repeated games (Sections 8.1–8.5 (preferences with discounting only)).

Class 11 (February 12)
Repeated games: Subgame perfect equilibrium (Section 8.8), finitely repeated games (Section 8.10).
Class 12 (February 14)
Extensive games with imperfect information: Introduction (Sections 11.1, 11.4, 11.5, 12.1–12.3).