5.3 Exercises on conditions under which a stationary point is a global optimum
- Find all the local maxima and minima (if any) of the following functions, and determine whether each local extremum is a global extremum.
- f(x, y) = −x3 + 2xy + y2 + x.
- f(x, y, z) = 1 − x2 − y2 − z2.
- First-order conditions are
f'1(x, y) = −3x2 + 2y + 1 = 0 f'2(x, y) = 2x + 2y = 0 The Hessian of f is
−6x 2 2 2 (−1, 1) is not a global minimizer: for example, f(2,0) = −6 < f(−1, 1) = −1.
- First-order conditions: f'1(x, y, z) = −2x = 0, f'2(x, y, z) = −2y = 0,
f'3(x, y, z) = −2z = 0. There is a unique solution, (x, y, z) = (0, 0, 0). The Hessian matrix is
−2 0 0 0 −2 0 0 0 −2 The Hessian is negative definite for all (x, y, z), so that f is concave. Thus (0, 0, 0) is a global maximizer.
- A competitive firm receives a price p > 0 for each unit of its output, pays a price w > 0 for each unit of its single input. Its output from using x units of the variable input is f(x). What do the results in Section 4 tell us about the value(s) of x that maximize the firm's profit in each of the
following cases? Find the firm's maximum profit in each case.
- f(x) = x1/4. [Refer to a previous exercise.]
- f(x) = x. [Treat the cases p = w and p ≠ w separately.]
- f(x) = x2.
- The firm's profit, as a function of x, is px1/4 − wx. By the previous exercise mentioned in the problem, this function is concave. Its stationary points are the solutions of p(1/4)x−3/4 − w = 0, so it has a single stationary point, x = (p/4w)4/3. This value of x is positive, so that it is in the interior of the interval on which f is defined, and hence by the first result in this section is the only positive global maximizer of the firm's profit. The firm's profit when x = (p/4w)4/3 is p(p/4w)1/3 − w(p/4w)4/3 = (1/41/3 − 1/44/3)p4/3/w1/3 = (3/44/3)(p4/3/w1/3) > 0. The firm's profit when x = 0 is 0, so the only maximizer of the firm's profit is x = (p/4w)4/3.
- If f(x) = x then the firm's profit is px − wx = (p − w)x, which is concave (the second derivative is zero).
- If p = w then every value of x is a stationary point, so that by the first result in this section every value of x > 0 is a global maximizer of the firm's profit. The firm's profit at every such value of x is 0, so that x = 0 is also a global maximizer.
- If p ≠ w the function has no stationary points. Thus the first result in the section implies that no value of x > 0 is a global maximizer. The firm's profit when x = 0 is 0, so this value of x maximizes the firm's profit if p < w (in which case the firm's profit for x > 0 is negative). If p > w, no value of x maximizes the firm's profit, which increases without bound as x increases.
- If f(x) = x2, the firm's profit is px2 − wx, which is not concave. By the first result in Section 4.4, if x maximizes profit then f'(x) = 0, or x = w/2p. The firm's profit at this value of x is −w2/4p < 0, while its profit for x = 0 is 0. Thus the only candidate for a maximizer of the firm's profit is x = 0. But looking at the function px2 − wx, we see that the firm's profit increases without bound, and hence has no maximum.
- Find all the local maximizers and local minimizers (if any) of the function f(x, y) = e3x − 3x + 4y2 − 1 (without any constraints). Determine whether each local maximizer you find is a global maximizer and whether each local minimizer is a global minimizer.
The first-order conditions are
f'x(x, y) = 3e3x − 3 = 0 f'y(x, y) = 8y = 0. 9e3x 0 0 8 - Let f(x1, x2) = x2
1 − x1x2 + x2
2 + 3x1 − 2x2 + 1.- Is f convex, concave, or neither?
- Find any local maxima or minima of f. Are they global maxima/minima?
- The Hessian matrix of f is
2 −1 −1 2 - The first-order conditions are
f'1(x1, x2) = 2x1 − x2 + 3 = 0 f'2(x1, x2) = −x1 + 2x2 − 2 = 0
- Using the results that relate the solutions of the first-order conditions with the solutions of maximization/minimization problems, what can you say about the local and global maxima and minima of the following functions?
- f(x, y, z) = x2 + 3y2 + 6z2 − 3xy + 4yz.
- f(x, y) = −x3 − y3 + 3xy.
- The first-order conditions are
2x − 3y = 0 6y − 3x + 4z = 0 12z + 4y = 0 2 −3 0 −3 6 4 0 4 12 - The first-order conditions are
−3x2 + 3y = 0 −3y2 + 3x = 0 −6x 3 3 −6y .
- Suppose that a firm that uses 2 inputs has the production function f(x1, x2) = 12x1/3
1x1/2
2 and faces the input prices (p1, p2) and the output price q.- Show that f is concave, so that the firm's profit is concave.
- Find a global maximum of the firm's profit (and give the input combination that achieves this maximum).
- The Hessian matrix at (x1, x2) is
−(8/3)x−5/3
1x1/2
22x−2/3
1x−1/2
22x−2/3
1x−1/2
2−3x1/3
1x−3/2
2−(8/3)x−5/3 < 0 and
1x1/2
28x−4/3 −
1x−1
24x−4/3 =
1x−1
24x−4/3 > 0. Hence the Hessian is negative definite, so that f is concave.
1x−1
2 - The first-order conditions for a maximum of profit are
qf'1(x1, x2) − p1 = 4qx−2/3
1x1/2
2 − p1 = 0qf'2(x1, x2) − p2 = 6qx1/3
1x−1/2
2 − p2 = 0x*1 = (24q2/p1p2)3 x*2 = (122q3/p1p2
2)2
- Suppose that a firm that uses 2 inputs has the production function f(x1, x2) = 4x1/4
1x1/4
2 (where (x1, x2) is the pair of amounts of the inputs) and faces the input prices (p1, p2) and the output price q.- Show that the firm's profit is a concave function of (x1, x2). (To show that f is concave, use first principles, not a general result about the concavity of Cobb-Douglas production functions.)
- Find the pair of inputs that maximizes the firm's profit.
- First consider the production function f. The Hessian matrix at (x1, x2) is
−(3/4)x−7/4
1x1/4
2(1/4)x−3/4
1x−3/4
2(1/4)x−3/4
1x−3/4
2−(3/4)x1/4
1x−7/4
2
1x1/4
2 < 0 and (9/16)x−3/2
1x−3/2
2 − (1/16)x−3/2
1x−3/2
2 = 2x−3/2
1x−3/2
2 > 0. Hence the Hessian is negative definite, so that f is concave. Thus given that the firm's revenue p1x1 + p2x2 is convex (and concave), the firm's profit, qf(x1, x2) − p1x1 − p2x2 is concave. - The first-order conditions for a maximum of profit are
qf'1(x1, x2) − p1 = qx−3/4
3x1/4
2 − p1 = 0qf'2(x1, x2) − p2 = qx1/4
1x−3/4
2 − p2 = 0.x*1 = q2/(p3
1p2)1/2x*2 = q2/(p1p3
2)1/2The objective function is concave, so this input combination globally maximizes the firm's profit.
- Solve the problem
maxx∫1where g is a function for which 0 ≤ g(y) ≤ 1 for all y and ∫1
0−(x−y)2g(y)dy,
0g(y)dy = 1.The second derivative of the objective function is −2, so that the objective function is concave. (Use Leibniz's formula.) The unique solution of the first-order condition is x = ∫1
0yg(y)dy, so this is the solution of the problem. (If g is a probability density function then ∫1
0yg(y)dy is the mean of y.) - A firm produces output using n inputs according to the differentiable production function f. It sells output at the price p and pays wi per unit for input i, i = 1, ..., n. Consider its profit maximization problem
maxzpf(z) − w·z subject to z ≥ 0.Throughout the problem fix the value of w.
- Does the extreme value theorem imply that this problem has a solution?
- Denote by π(p) the firm's maximal profit, given p. Show that π'(p) = f(z*(p)). [Hint: Use the first-order conditions for the maximization problem.]
- Let q(p) = f(z*(p)), the output that the firm produces. By a previous problem, π is convex. What testable restrictions does this property of π imply for q, given the result in (b)? (What does the convexity of π tell you about its second derivative? How is the second derivative related to the derivative of q*?)
- No, since the constraint set is not bounded.
- We have
π'(p) = f(z*(p)) + ∑nNow, the first-order conditions for the firm's maximization problem are pf'j(z*(p)) − wj = 0 for all j, so each term in square brackets is zero.
j=1 [pf'j(z*(p))·∂z*j/∂p − wj·∂z*j/∂p]. - The convexity of π means that π"(p) ≥ 0 for all p. From (b) we have π"(p) = q'(p). Thus the theory predicts that the output of a profit-maximizing firm is an increasing function of the price of output. That is, the supply function is upward-sloping.
- A firm produces the output of a single good in two plants, using a single input. The amount of the input it uses in plant i is zi. The output in each plant depends on the inputs in both plants (there is an interaction between the plants): the output in plant 1 is f(z1, z2)
and that in plant 2 is g(z1, z2), where f and g are differentiable. The price of output is p > 0 and the price of the input is w > 0. Thus the firm's profit, which it wishes to maximize, is p[f(z1,
z2) + g(z1, z2)] − w(z1 + z2).
- What are the first-order conditions for a solution of the firm's problem?
- If (z*1, z*2) maximizes the firm's profit and z*i > 0 for i = 1, 2, then does (z*1, z*2) necessarily satisfy the first-order conditions?
- If (z*1, z*2) satisfies the first-order conditions and z*i > 0 for i = 1, 2, then does (z*1, z*2) necessarily maximize the firm's profit? If not, are there any conditions on f and g under which (z*1, z*2) does necessarily maximize the firm's profit?
- First-order conditions:
p[f'1(z*1, z*2) + g'1(z*1, z*2)] − w = 0 p[f'2(z*1, z*2) + g'2(z*1, z*2)] − w = 0 - Yes: at an interior maximum the first-order conditions must be satisfied.
- No: a solution of the first-order conditions is not necessarily a maximizer. If f and g are concave, however, then the objective function is concave, so the first-order conditions are sufficient.
- You have the following information about f, a function of n variables:
- f is differentiable
- f'i(x) = 0 for i = 1, ..., n if and only if x = x1, x = x2, x = x3, x = x4, or x = x5
- the Hessian H of f is negative definite at x1, negative semidefinite at x2, positive definite at x3, negative definite at x4, and positive definite at x5
- f(x1) = 3, f(x2) = 6, f(x3) = 2, f(x4) = 6, f(x5) = 5.
The only possible local or global maximizers or minimizers of f are x1, x2, x3, x4, and x5. Thus if f has a maximum then x2 and x4 are its global maximizers, and if it has a minimum then x3 is its global minimizer. Whether or not it has a maximum or a minimum, x1 and x4 are local maximizers, and x3 and x5 are local minimizers. - A firm faces uncertain demand D and has inventory I. It chooses its stock level Q ≥ 0 to minimize
g(Q) = c(Q − I) + h∫Qwhere c, I, h, p, and a are positive constants with p > c, and f is a nonnegative function that satisfies ∫a0f(D)dD = 1 (so that it can be interpreted as a probability distribution function).
0(Q−D)f(D)dD + p∫a
Q(D−Q)f(D)dD,- Denote by Q* the stock level that minimizes g(Q). Write down the first-order condition for Q* (in terms of c, I, h, p, and integrals involving the function f).
- What is the relation (if any) between an interior solution of the first-order condition and the solution of the problem? (Be precise.)
- Find the solution Q* in the case that f(D) = 1/a for all D.
- The first-order condition is
g'(Q*) = c + h∫Q*
0f(D)dD − p∫a
Q*f(D)dD = 0. - g'(Q) = c + h∫Q
0f(D)dD − p∫a
Qf(D)dD and g"(Q) = (h + p)f(Q) ≥ 0 for all Q, so g is convex. Thus Q* > 0 solves the problem if and only if it satisfies the first-order condition. - When f(D) = 1/a for all D, the first-order condition is
c + (h/a)∫Q*or
0dD − (p/a)∫a
Q*dD = 0,c + (h/a)Q* − (p/a)(a − Q*) = 0,orc + (h+p)Q*/a − p = 0,orQ*= a(p − c)/(h + p).
- A politician chooses the number of hours h ≥ 0 of advertising that she buys; the cost of h hours is c(h), where c is a convex function. She wishes to maximize g(π(h))−c(h), where π(h) is her probability of winning when she buys h hours of advertising. Assume that π is a concave
function, and g is an increasing and concave function.
- Write down the first-order condition for an interior solution (i.e. a solution h* with h* > 0) of this problem.
- What is the relation (if any) between an interior solution of the first-order condition and the solution of the problem? (Be precise.)
- First-order condition: g'(π(h))π'(h) − c'(h) = 0.
- Since g is increasing and concave and π are concave, g(π(h)) is concave; since c is convex, −c is concave. Thus g(π(h)) − c(h) is the sum of two concave functions, and hence is concave. We conclude that an interior solution of the first-order condition is a solution of the problem.
- A firm sells goods in two markets. In each market i the price is fixed at pi, with pi > 0. The amount of the good the firm sells in each market depends on its advertising expenditure in both markets. If it spends ai on advertising in market i, for i = 1, 2, its sales in
market 1 are f(a1,a2) and its sales in market 2 are g(a1, a2), where f and g are twice differentiable functions. The firm's cost of production is zero. Thus its profit is
p1f(a1,a2) + p2g(a1, a2) − a1 − a2.It chooses (a1, a2) to maximize this profit.
- What are the first-order conditions for the firm's optimization problem?
- Suppose that (a*1, a*2) maximizes the firm's profit and a*i > 0 for i = 1, 2. Does (a*1, a*2) necessarily satisfy the first-order conditions?
- Suppose that (a*1, a*2) satisfies the first-order conditions and a*i > 0 for i = 1, 2. Under what condition is (a*1, a*2) a local maximizer of the firm's profit?
- Suppose that (a*1, a*2) satisfies the first-order conditions and a*i > 0 for i = 1, 2. Under what conditions on the functions f and g is (a*1, a*2) necessarily a global maximizer of the firm's profit?
- The first-order conditions are
p1f'i(a*1, a*2) + p2g'i(a*1, a*2) − 1 = 0 for all i = 1,2.
- Yes: any interior solution of a maximization problem in which the objective function is differentiable satisfies the first-order condition.
- If (a*1, a*2) satisfies the first-order conditions and the Hessian of the objective function at (a*1, a*2) is negative definite then (a*1, a*2) is a local maximizer. The Hessian is
p1f"11(a*1, a*2) + p2g"11(a*1, a*2) p1f"12(a*1, a*2) + p2g"12(a*1, a*2) p1f"21(a*1, a*2) + p2g"21(a*1, a*2) p1f"22(a*1, a*2) + p2g"22(a*1, a*2) . - If f and g are concave then the objective function is concave (since the sum of concave functions is concave), and hence any solution of the first-order conditions is a global maximizer.